State capacity and rule of law: the case of Upper Egypt by Abu Zahra, Reem
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
2-1-2011 
State capacity and rule of law: the case of Upper Egypt 
Reem Abu Zahra 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Abu Zahra, R. (2011).State capacity and rule of law: the case of Upper Egypt [Master’s thesis, the 
American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1063 
MLA Citation 
Abu Zahra, Reem. State capacity and rule of law: the case of Upper Egypt. 2011. American University in 
Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1063 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
i 
 
 
The American University in Cairo 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
  
State Capacity and Rule of Law 
The Case of Upper Egypt 
A Thesis Submitted to 
The Department of Political Science 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Arts 
By  
Reem Fuad Mohamed Youssef Abu Zahra 
Under the supervision of Dr. Samer Soliman 
 
 
January 2012 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1 
Chapter I: “State Capacity” Defined ..............................................................................................17 
 Chapter II : Law and Custom ........................................................................................................41 
Chapter III: Tha‟r in Upper Egypt Described  ...............................................................................66 
Chapter IV: Police and Tha‟r .........................................................................................................81 
Chapter V: Local Systems of Conflict Resolution: A Tool Serving Authoritarian Control  .......104 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................123 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................129 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This research addresses the question of 'state capacity' or official governability. The 
ultimate motive behind this research is to discover the factors contributing to state weakness or 
the lack of its capacity to govern. Governability or social control is a necessary characteristic of 
any human community to organize inter-human behavior through putting forward constraints on 
individuals as well as organizations‟ actions. Governability implies the existence of a certain 
order according to which people abide and an enforcement mechanism enacting these rules. 
Compliance is awarded; deviance is punished, and the daily encounters that are neither punished 
nor rewarded are the “norms.” In very simple terms, governability means the ability to „get 
things done,‟ and its antonym is “chaos.” In this regard, human communities fall somewhere 
along a spectrum of effectiveness or ineffectiveness. Scholars have not yet developed any 
theories explaining “governance,” but there are only scattered ideas. Most scholarly contribution 
focuses on the functional scope of different social actors, including the state, the power dynamics 
governing them and their impact on society. However, rarely can one find a text explaining the 
intensity of governance. This research does not tackle the degree of state omnipresence or its 
functional scope. It deals with governance and law enforcement. Accordingly, the research starts 
from a premise that the state‟s “governability” is weak in Egypt.  
There are different forms of governability, formal and informal governability. Informal 
governability means having a system of rule making and rule enforcement that is outside the 
apparatus of the state.  It exists in traditional or tribal societies where society polices itself 
without a need to have an external enforcement agency. The rules governing people‟s behavior 
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are not codified in certain laws or regulations. They rely mostly on a customary law that has been 
built all over a long period of time.  
However, in modern societies, the rules are not self-enforced. Societies delegate the 
authority to enforce laws to an entity called “the state.” That entity is an abstract concept, but it is 
materialized into a range of official institutions. There are formal laws governing people‟s 
behavior with regards to access to services, inter-human interaction in the public space and even 
within the institution itself. The state is expected to fulfill its purpose of organizing the human 
community and the resources within that society, and it does that by means of institutions or sub-
organs governed by rules themselves that they should abide by to be able to function and achieve 
their goals in society.  
 If state rules are not producing the intended effect on society, state institutions could 
resort to other informal means like violence or acquiescence or giving up to informality; and all 
are signs of governability crisis or weakness. Either the institution in charge of the law 
enforcement process suffers a problem that hinders it from achieving its goal or the society holds 
no respect for the state by disregarding its rules. In both cases, the purpose of the state is 
defeated.  
This perspective builds on the dominant conception of the core of “stateness” which 
emphasizes the use of force. All definitions of state emphasize the idea of enforcement or control 
to achieve its goals, regardless of what they are. This research tackles the conceptual problem of 
what “the state” means and adopts the Weberian concepts of “traditional” versus “modern” 
societies. The literature often differentiates between modern and traditional societies in terms of 
nature of laws or the content of these laws. For example a modern society would be more 
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industrialized, more socially liberal, less restrictive of women‟s freedom and so forth, while a 
traditional society would generally be the opposite. There is no clear-cut line distinguishing both 
types of societies. Scholars often use the “good-things-go-together” approach.1 Weber, however, 
is concerned more with the „modus operandi‟ organizing governance in a society, or the 
government structure in such societies, as well as the type of authority vested into this entity, the 
state. It is the existence of a formal modus operandi that distinguishes a modern from a 
traditional society. However, force is not enough. Violence in society has to have a legitimate 
social basis, as Weber explicitly says, or it has to conform with an “image” or a “social meaning” 
as Joel Migdal spells it out. On the other hand, the legitimacy of certain rules alone is not 
enough. The more complex and “bureaucratized” the state is, the more modern it is. In a 
traditional society, where kinship plays a significant role in governing human relations, laws and 
rules are self-enforced, while in modern societies, there is a formal bureaucratized structure 
responsible for upholding the rules or laws governing inter-human relationship. The mere 
existence of the state entails delegation of authority to the state to use violence. Therefore, the 
state is strong as long as it is capable of upholding rule of law and weak in so far as it does not. 
The Weberian concept of stateness is compatible with the dominant liberal classical 
political economy approach of the state. The liberal approach is not „anti-state.‟ The liberal 
approach assumes the existence of a state responsible for certain tasks aimed at providing a 
platform for the economy to function on its own like. Such public goods are stability, effective 
regulatory structure, curbing externalities and ensuring competition by allowing free entry to the 
market. The liberal and neoliberal approaches focus on a state that is “limited” in terms of the 
number of functions it performs, but assumes it is “strong” and “effective” in achieving the 
                                                          
1 As Huntington nicely spelt out in his famous work Political Order in Changing Societies 
4 
 
limited functions ascribed to it. This piece of research attempts to examine the strength/weakness 
of the Egyptian state to enforce rule of law. 
Weak Governance in Egypt 
The state problem in Egypt is widely felt and recognized by different classes in Egypt. Salwa 
Ismael, in her account of the people of Boulak El Dakrur, one of the poor districts of Cairo, 
emphasized people‟s perspective of the state. They all said, “mafeesh dawla” (there is no state). 2 
Recently, there has been a famous incident when a large number of people in Shubra were 
subject to a big robbery by a man who claimed would invest their money, but ran away with it. 
When the news spread out that he disappeared, none of the victims reported him. They went to 
his villas, and buildings to take what they can get, even the iron or wood. In Nov. 2006, on the 
day of the Islamic festival, Eid, a number of young men attacked women on the street. It was an 
accident of sexual harassment on a mass scale on a crowded street. Ordinary citizens and shop 
owners defended the women and beat the assaulters. The police station was steps away from the 
accident, but the Ministry of Interior denied the event on the premise that “no one reported the 
event” or filed any charges. When interviewed, eye witnesses said they did not go to the police. 
These are mere recent examples, but there are plenty of them. The state is weak in people‟s eyes, 
and that became a visible problem.  Police is publicly perceived as the institution where cases are 
fabricated and citizens are tortured. Even the media has become outspoken about the loss of state 
“dignity” in people‟s eyes. Even some movie makers became daring in portraying police 
brutality and corruption which made the Ministry of Interior try to campaign through other TV 
series and songs to counter that impression.  
                                                          
 
 Ismael, Salwa, Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State (Cairo: American 
University in Cairo Press, 2006).  
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Projection of power may not reflect real power. Some may argue that the state is very 
powerful and sometimes only the projection of power is enough for people to comply and restore 
peace. For example, in Beit Allam, a village in Upper Egypt, a famous and bloody vengeance 
„tha’r’ incident took the form of mass murder and 22 individuals were ambushed and killed in an 
ongoing blood feud incident between two families in the village. The state moved a huge number 
of tanks and amassed a huge number of soldiers and officers and stayed at the scene. Leaders in 
the ministry of interior negotiated peace and the leaders, even the leader of the family whose 
members were massacred, had to comply in front of the huge might of the state security 
apparatus. However, that is a sign of weakness more than a sign of strength. “Strength” means 
the state apparatus has a stable, predictable and impersonal system of conflict resolution. Had the 
state had that stable system, it would not need all that power to demonstrate. If the state enjoys 
public trust, people would have known that that could be the result of their actions and it would 
not have needed to use (or threaten to use) that incredible amount of force. According to the 
tribal traditions of Upper Egypt, forgiving the killing of 22 members of a family is a huge 
violation of tribal law and shame to live with. That means that it was the state threat to use force 
extensively that forced the leaders to restore order nothing more. However, the hatred causing 
the blood bath persists, and it is, by nature, cross-generational. The police institution can project 
violence and threaten to use it; but it does not have the power to apply rule of law, which is in 
this case bringing a number of murderers from both families to justice. While the police 
institution has the logistic power to bring a number of murderers to justice, it resorts to 
settlements through customary tribunals. This is what the thesis would try to examine, the 
political consideration and priorities of the police system that prevents it from applying rule of 
law and performing its normal job of “law enforcement.”  
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Different anthropological studies attribute the inability of state or form a legal system to 
penetrate what is called “traditional” societies such as Upper Egyptian villages to customs. 
However, this is a circular argument explaining customs by customs. It reveals inability to 
properly analyze the economic power structures within the Egyptian Upper Egyptian village. It 
ignores the evolution of customary tribunals and the changes taking place to it, the social 
changes inside the families or tribes. Also, it ignores the different authoritarian political tools 
affecting the scene. In fact, a deeper look at the power system within the villages and its relations 
to the security system add to the explanation why the state, with its judiciary as well as law 
enforcement arms, is unable to penetrate society. The main argument is that the law enforcement 
arm of the state assumes a political role has weakened the role of the state by channeling its 
resources to the „wrong‟ direction and stripping it of its „credibility‟ or, to use a political role, 
„legitimacy.‟ 
Different Ideas Explain State Weakness and Strength 
Ideas attempting to explain state are scattered. Social phenomena are the product of both 
state-society interactions. In other words, it is a combination between state institutions and social 
behavior. Public policy specialists may tend to favor the state-centered way of explaining 
institutional weakness/strength.    
In public sector management, there are standard rules or principles for managing public 
agencies; however, public policy in reality is “idiosyncratic.” 3 Public policy theories are based 
on wrong premises. First, they assume that there are standard goals of public policy; and 
therefore, there are standard rules that should be followed to strengthen state institutions. In 
                                                          
 
 Fukuyama,  Francis, State- Building: Governance and World Order in the 21
st
 Century, ( New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), 82 
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reality, while each organization might have specific goals of functions, the goals of different 
organizations often “evolve” and “emerge as the result of interactions among different 
organizations.”4 Second, it is hard to monitor the outputs of agents in different formal 
organizations. It is hard to measure the quality of the output of some public organization, 
especially those organizations like public education or health care where hidden action problems 
are hard to track though not impossible. 
5
 “Hidden Action Problem” is about the agent-principal 
relationship. Agents have more hands-on experience with the operation of the work and hence, 
s/he has more knowledge. The problem is that it is hard to measure the “honesty” or “quality” of 
the agent‟s performance. 6 Therefore, some states rely on a mixture of formal and informal 
mechanism. 
7
  In the private sector, it is easy to measure the magnitude of hidden action 
problems because it is easy to measure the production output. However, in other public sectors 
like public education or health care, it is hard to view or measure the impact of the hidden 
knowledge, totally possessed by the agent. 
8
 Third, "the appropriate degree of delegated 
discretion will vary according to the endogenous and exogenous conditions that an organization 
faces over time." The more complex the economy and society becomes, there has to be a higher 
level of delegation of authority. The process of delegating authority is risky because it may 
increase the levels of corruption. So, there has to be an answer as to how much authority to be 
delegated.
9
  
 
                                                          
 
 Fukuyama, 50-3. 
 
 Fukuyama 55-61. 
 
 Solonik, Steven Lee. The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China.1996 .World Politics. Vol. 48, 
No. 2, Pp 209-239. 
 
 Fukuyama, 51-61. 
 
 Ibid. 
 
 Fukuyama, 67-76) 
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The Focus of this Research: Police Institution 
Manifestations of stateness are evident in every aspect of people's lives, from birth, 
schooling, working, housing, traveling, marrying, and receiving medical treatment until death. 
Therefore, studying the state means studying its daily, small and common events as they reveal 
the rules of the game, formal and informal in state-society interactions.
10
  One can study the state 
in all different walks of life. This research will focus on one institution, the police institution in 
its daily interaction with society. The reasons behind choosing this institution are plenty. First, 
security is a function inherent to the state. The functional scope of the state may vary from a 
country to another. What kinds of services should the state provide differ drastically among 
different countries. However, only security and defense is the agreed upon function of the state. 
Therefore, the research will not get into the usual arguments about a big state or a limited state. 
Most economic theories, even the most skeptical towards state intervention in various walks of 
life such as neoclassical economics, require the state to perform these roles. Weber, as mentioned 
earlier, refused the functional definitions of the state on the basis that there are no agreed upon 
functions inherent in the concept of stateness. However, there are basic functions that, 
customarily, are and should not be performed by an entity other than the state. These are defense 
against foreign invasion, domestic security and building an infrastructure. Second, a secure 
atmosphere is indispensible for development. It is a prerequisite for healthy political and 
economic life.  A democracy cannot work without an efficient police system and no investment 
would appear in an area that has security concerns. Investors will never risk their money in a 
                                                          
10 Painter, Joe. “Prosaic Geographies of Stateness.” Political Geography (2006), Vol.25, 7. Science Direct.   
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place with a high rate of crime or a high potential for conflicts to erupt.
11
  Therefore, this 
research will focus on the area least penetrated by the state, Upper Egypt.  
Why Upper Egypt?  
Most researchers hesitate considering the persistence of blood feud a problem of state 
capacity. This lack of attention is due to the urban bias of scholarly works. These areas viewed as 
remote areas that lie and they are least affected by development projects. But in fact, they are 
neither remote nor limited areas. A big proportion of Egyptians lives there and is affected by 
weak state governability. Second, scholarly works tend to exclude cultural explanations and 
refuse them totally on the grounds of being chauvinistic or cultural essentialist, which is true. 
However, culture is introduced here as only a part that contributes to the making up of both the 
formal and informal rules within every institution. Such remote and "underdeveloped areas are 
important, especially that most of African and Arab countries have similar problem of power 
entities within the state, clan, tribe, etc, defying, if not the mere existence of the state, they are 
challenging state power. Building on the assumption that 'the state' is important for the discourse 
on development, this thesis will introduce an eclectic approach of studying state capacity 
attributing it to cultural as well as structural factors.   
The Importance of the Topic 
The discipline of studying governability has its roots in Samuel Huntington's harsh 
critique of modernization theory that assumed all countries of the developing would eventually 
                                                          
  
 This argument is totally different form the arguments of various Middle Eastern regimes justifying their 
authoritarian rule.  
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go through a transition to modernization, understood as "all good things go together." 
12
 
Huntington was concerned with containing the effects of modernization arguing that 
modernization policies like democratic and economic reform would lead to destabilizing factors 
eroding states power to fulfill their basic function, govern. His advice is for these states to 
institutionalize their modes of governance so that they become less vulnerable to de-stabilizing 
events. The main weakness of this argument is that all traditional societies have their own 
institutions. They are only different. Therefore, the aim is not to create shared expectations, 
because they already exist, but rather to create ones that could function and produce the effects 
of modernization and compatible with new conditions. F. A. Hayek and Doglous North both 
have been concerned with the issue of trying to emphasize the importance of governance to 
economics. North emphasized the idea of building predictability. Hayek introduced the 
importance of "rule of law" to economic prosperity. For the economy to function, there has to be 
a strong state capable of devoting its "coercive measures" to guarantee building an atmosphere of 
trust in the enforceability contractual relationships. 
13
 In fact, recent economic analyses elaborate 
that Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) put issues of political stability and social order at the 
forefront of their priorities in their cost-benefit analysis for choosing a country to invest in 
weather this predictability is derived from the formal rules, countries in the west, or informal 
rules, China, it should be there.   
 
 
                                                          
12  Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies, The Henry L. Stimson ed. (Virginia: Yale University 
Press, 1968)   
13  Hayek, F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), 220- 32. 
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Different theoretical schools are incapable in explaining the state weakness in Upper Egypt.  
The behaviorlist approach often ascribes phenomenon to characteristics, attitudes and 
belief systems. They would perceive security problems in Upper Egypt as a pure phenomenon of 
state facing strong and deeply entrenched social belief system that the state cannot penetrate. 
Therefore, the state is doomed to be weak until that belief system and public attitudes change. 
However, such perspective misses out on the complexity of real phenomenon. The state is visible 
and capable of inflicting change in Upper Egypt. It misses out the details of the negotiated space 
between the heads of families, government officials and the population. There are situations 
where the state interferes strongly and imposes rule of law on all parties. In response to the Beit 
Allam massacre of vengeance between two families, the state responded very aggressively and 
restored to or enforced rule of law with all its might. Till now, no troubles have emerged in Beit 
Allam again.  
In addition, the behavioral approach tends to be very reductionist downsizing other 
elements of influence. For example, the public policy literature highlights the “intermediate 
institutions” of those at the implementation level not the decision making level. There is a gap 
between both that may alter choices and cause huge change.  
The rational choice perspective assume that individuals are self-interested utility 
maximizes and all behavior could be explained in these terms. In fact rational choice scholars 
recognize the importance of institutions on imposing constraints on the behavior of actors and 
therefore cause a change in their course of action.  The prisoner dilemma game provides a great 
example. “When the rules (institutions) are changed, the prisoner‟s choices (to defect, to 
cooperate and so on) also change because the rules structure the choices that will maximize the 
12 
 
prisoner‟s self interest.” 14 However, historical intuitionalism perceives the “strict rationality” of 
rational choice theory is “overly confining.”15 There are cultural behavioral elements involved. 
In short, studying institutions does not mean that one introduces a new variable.  Historical 
institutionalism means that “the structure of political situations leaves its own imprint on 
political outcomes.” 16 Politics is all about constantly re-drawing or re-negotiating the rule of the 
game in public space.  
Literature Review and Methodology 
The literature is diversified since the topic is cross-disciplinary. For the theoretical part, the 
research drew from different primary and less on secondary sources discussing the concepts of 
“the state” and “rule of law.”  
The literature on the police was harder to find. There are few books in bookstores and 
libraries on the Police. However, the author managed to apply for a special permission from the 
Ministry of Interior to have access to the Police Academy Research Center Library affiliated to 
the Police Academy formally known as “Mubarak Academy for Security.” The library was rich 
with sources covering different aspect of policing; however, there were limits to the author‟s 
ability to browse through the books and dissertations. The choice of books and dissertations was 
limited to those related to „tha’r,‟ and the author, every time she reads a book, had to write down 
in a special note card what chapters she read. In addition, photocopying is prohibited for visitors. 
However, it was very useful in terms of providing data and statistics on Tha‟r that are not 
available to the public. Most importantly, it described how police officers think of the 
                                                          
14
  Steinmo, Sven, Katheleen Thelen , Frank Longstreth. Structuring Politics: Historical intuitionalism in 
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1992), 7.  
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Ibid, 9. 
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phenomenon, deal with it and what they think are the proper strategies to deal with it. That is 
critical when analyzing the relationship between police and the people in Upper Egypt.  In 
addition, there are few historical documents that are mainly descriptive of the police from a 
historical perspective.  Some other background books focused on the torture exercised by the 
police.  
As for Tha‟r in Upper Egypt, there is no enough literature on the subject except for very 
few books and published articles that are mainly descriptive rather than analytical. Therefore, the 
author used a historical archive of news stories covering the topic from the year 2002-2007. She 
also relied on making some interviews to get to know more about the rule of custom in people‟s 
lives in Upper Egypt. The fieldwork focused on two villages in Manfalout city in Assyut 
governorate, Al Mandara and Nazza Kararr. Each provides a different example of customary 
forms of conflict resolution that are prevalent in other parts of Egypt. The interviews covered 
major customary judges and heads of families, a lawyer who was involved in many of these 
cases as well as some ordinary people who had experiences with customary tribunals.  
Chapter 1 provides a conceptual framework that discusses the different theories of the 
state and attempts to define the concept of “state capacity” linking it the broader developmental 
context and arguing that state capacity is closely associated with the ability to enforce rule of law 
through its executive arm. The chapter outlined the different theoretical debates surrounding the 
concept of state capacity arguing that rule of law enforcement is the most important element of 
stateness, and the state‟s ability to enforce rule of law the major determinant of its “capacity.” 
The state is the "human community that successfully claims the monopoly over the legitimate 
14 
 
use of physical force within a given territory,"
17
 and therefore, the ability to “legitimately” and 
“successfully” use force is the biggest challenge the state could face, and that is the determinant 
of its capacity.  
Chapter two discusses customary tribunals and how they work in different places in 
Egypt. However, understanding how customs works cannot be understood outside of the broader 
context of the Egyptian legal reality, both formal and informal. It is crucial to understanding the 
broader of framework of the relationship between customs and law on the one hand and the 
entire legal design in Egypt on the other. Custom is one of the pillars of the Egyptian formal 
legal design like many other states. However, there are cases when customs violate state rules, 
but they are accepted for political considerations. In this sense, when the customary legal design 
violates that of the state, questions regarding state power arise. The chapter argues that both the 
customary and formal legal designs are neither in conflict nor in harmony.  The Egyptian legal 
reality is an outcome of interaction between both customary as well as formal state legal systems.  
Chapter three explains and describes what tha’r is, the rules governing tha’r, the 
irrelevance of any difference between vendetta and manslaughter in Upper Egyptian culture, the 
geographical distribution of tha’r and magnitude. The main argument of the chapter is refuting 
the culturist perspective that attributes spread of tha’r to poverty and education and highlights 
the institutional weaknesses of the police force that affect its performance.  
Chapter four discusses the performance of the police institution as the main agent of the 
state in dealing with tha’r. The police institution in Egypt perceives the „tha’r’ as a purely 
sociological phenomenon that requires social and political remedies rather than a security 
                                                          
17 Weber, 78. 
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problem blaming the spread of tha’r to old decedent traditions and lack of religious awareness. 
Such a perception has pushed the police institution to adopt social and political tools to solve the 
problem deviating from their real function, law enforcement. Instead of using the various 
criminal investigation tools, the police force is working in a totally different venue, customary 
tribunals. In the mean time, police officers suffer a sense of victimization and injustice being 
blamed for the failures of the political regime and failures to quell opposition since 1952 coup. 
The Ministry has also imposed harsh working conditions on the officers affecting their 
performance. They suffer harsh conditions and take the blame for the political failures of the 
regime.  
 Chapter five delves into the case of Upper Egypt where the customary legal system 
violates or challenges the essence of stateness with the help of the Egyptian Regime by 
examining the conflict resolution system in two villages in the Upper Egyptian Governorate of 
Assyut, Al Mandara and Nazza Karrar where the researcher did field work.  The main argument 
of this chapter is that the law enforcement arm of the state assumes a political role, it weakens 
the role of the state by channeling its resources to the „wrong‟ direction and stripping it of its 
„credibility‟ or, to use a political role, „legitimacy.‟ 
The thesis concludes with examining the potential for change in the future. Any change 
of the customary system of conflict resolution might compromise the power of many local 
leaders. Therefore, even if there is a will to change and make institutional reforms to the state 
institutions involved in the process of conflict resolution, will the regime be willing to/capable of 
bearing the cost of conflict with “losers” from this change?  
16 
 
By nature, the state is one of the very powerful tools capable of inflicting change if the 
political regime controlling it is willing to. Of course it cannot eliminate such a deeply 
entrenched phenomenon especially after decades of official recognition and encouragement; 
however, state intervention in the right direction may provide an alternative to the people. 
Historically, people resorted to customary forms of conflict resolution mainly because of 
pragmatic reasons. If the conditions change, an increasing number of people will move towards 
more just paths of conflict resolution rather than having to comply with political power 
compromises that could be unjust many times.  
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CHAPTER I 
“THE STATE CAPACITY” DEFINED 
 
 The Conceptual Problem: The Concept of the “State” Reintroduced               
               In their endeavor to explain the mystery of development and underdevelopment and 
how socio-political and economic phenomena take place, scholars have attempted to pinpoint 
and understand the sources of power to achieve change. Social sciences have always been 
concerned with the sources of power causing social phenomena to happen. Where does power 
lie? How rules of how others should behave are made? Discovering the source of socio-political 
and economic change is the huge mystery. Each school of thought focuses on certain elements; 
behaviorists focus on cultural explanations; rational choice theorists focus on rational 
calculations of self-interested individuals, and Marxists focus more on class conflict. In terms of 
units of analysis, scholars usually study either government structure to explain behavior or look 
at the people and their culture and belief systems to explain phenomenon. 
             Nonetheless, with limited success of these schools, new ones emerged introducing a new 
unit of analysis, the state, and scholars then developed the new concept that causes a great deal 
of confusion, “state capacity.” That term is often used to vaguely refer to a state ability to 
achieve development. Some states are classified along a wide spectrum of strength and 
weakness. Countries, such as Iraq and Sudan are labeled "failed states." Lebanon and most 
countries of the developing world are classified as "weak states." This concept has been very 
controversial in the literature. It is widely believed that labels such as "failed" or "weak" states 
were used to justify foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of nations of the developing 
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world.  Countries with interventionist intentions argue that state "failure" tends to spill over their 
countries causing problems like illegal migration and sometimes terrorist attacks the most critical 
of which was September eleventh bombings. Such labeling is often met with cynicism as hiding 
“colonial” or at least “interventionist” intentions. Nevertheless, the question of state capacity, 
heavily studied by scholars adopting a “statist approach” is older than all the current security 
issues.  The "state" as a unit of analysis has been used earlier. "Bringing it back in" intellectual 
discourse and analysis was in the eighties of the twentieth century before global terrorism has 
become an issue of concern.  
              Some scholars (re)introduced “the state” as a unit of analysis or an independent actor in 
socio-political literature after being absent for ages, except in the Marxist tradition. Until the 
fifties, the study of the state meant describing the system of governance, the difference between 
republic, federal, monarchial systems, voting, legislation, interest groups and the kind. The 
assumption was that the formal rules are the only explanation of reality. However, the fifties and 
seventies marked the rise of the behaviorist and structural-functionalist schools of thought in the 
discourse about development that rejected this sterile way of studying government (or 
governance) and introducing sociology to the political discourse. The result is the total 
abandonment of the use of state and its institutions as a unit of analysis and the beginning of a 
“society-centered” approach.  In the mid/late seventies, some scholars, neoweberians as well as 
Marxists, started to (re)take “the state” seriously. Charles Tilly talked about the historical 
development of the nation state. Peter Katzenstein was the first to classify states as "strong" and 
19 
 
"weak."
18
 He understood state 'weakness' and 'strength' in terms of the number or the scope of 
functions it performs relative to each other. He made his comparative analysis among countries 
of the North. Theda Skocpol and Alfred Stepan built on the Weberian definition of the state 
arguing that the state is "more than the 'government'." "It is the continuous administrative, legal, 
bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relationships between civil 
society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within 
civil society as well."
19
  This was the first step towards reviving the talk about the state away 
from the rigid methods of the forties of the twentieth century.  
             Scholars who use, the so called "statist approach," are the ones who reject what Theda 
Skocpol, calls, "society-centered" approaches. The state became a separate unit of analysis that 
should be studied on its own along with “the society.”  
On the left side of the spectrum, Millinbad and Nicos Poulantzas built on the Marxist 
tradition. Marx perceived the state as the structure that serves as an executive arm of the 
bourgeoisie. Poulantzas modified the Marxists perspective arguing that state structures and its 
strategies are “moments in a dynamic process of development.” In other words, the nature of 
state institutions is in a continuous process of change where the state becomes selective of the 
class or the fraction it supports. “Class struggle dominant in a society traverses the very 
institutional materiality of the state.”20 In this sense, the state enjoys a certain degree of 
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autonomy from the bourgeoisie class. It may act in their long term interest, but it may also stand 
against the bourgeoisie if they increase their “exploitation” of the working class to maintain the 
stability of the capitalist system to save it from itself when the bourgeois greed creates social 
unrest. 
Statist Approach 
                  The statist or neo-institutionalist approach provides a more sophisticated 
understanding of the complex social reality. Generally, the statist approach has five basic 
characteristics. First, it concentrates on issues of rule, governance and control. Second, it 
assumes that the state has a life of its own, and it could be treated as a variable. The political 
sphere is "not atomistic." There are institutional constraints on leaders that hinder them from 
implementing certain policies even if they are willing to. It is not a mere "reflection" of societal 
interests, rejecting the pluralist paradigm. Third, there is a great deal of emphasis on the 
institutional constraints, both formal and informal, on both citizens' and officials' behavior. It 
assumes all parties have certain powers and capable of causing some change. This set of powers 
is defined by the rules, the formal and informal, and they change over time. Fourth, it is vital to 
understand the history or the evolution of institutions to explain the rules governing an 
institution. Historical choices alter the institutional configuration changing future choices. In 
other words, it recognizes „historical contingency‟ and „path dependency.‟ Changing 
circumstances alter each actor‟s definition of his/her own interests. Lastly, it assumes that 
political conflicts are all about attempts to change the rules of the game. Politics is about who 
(re)defines the rules of the game.
21
 In this sense, the entire discipline of politics is all about 
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changing the „rule so the game.‟ In short, the statist school assumes the existence of a different 
structure of power that is capable of affecting the outcomes of regime policies or even altering 
them altogether, a structure that is different from society but interacts with it. While the  
The theoretical debate surrounding the concept of the „state‟ and the nature of „stateness,‟ 
is related to the question of state autonomy. Pluralists and Marxists both perceive the state as an 
actor dependant on the different social forces within society. The state is an apparatus that 
merely reflects the power struggles within society.
22
 Whoever controls that apparatus controls 
the course of events. Realists and institutionalists, however, tend to perceive the state as an 
independent source of power that has a life of its own, and it is capable of “pushing other actors 
down particular historical paths”23 including the regime itself or those governing the state. In 
other words, they seek to analytically separate the state from different social forces.  
           The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and analyze the different conceptions of the term, 
„state capacity”. First, the author will discuss the concepts of “state” and analyzes the debates 
around it adopting the Weberian concept of the „state.‟ Based on that definition and continuing 
that same of line of thinking, the author will attempt to discuss the concept of „state capacity‟ 
arguing that rule of law enforcement is the most important element of stateness, and the state‟s 
ability to enforce rule of law the major determinant of its “capacity.” 
The State: Historical Roots 
The debate on the state dates back to the Greek and Roman philosophy. Aristotle made a 
distinction between political power and other kinds of power exercised by humans over others. 
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Political power has a “peculiar quality” other than the size or the degree of power. This quality is 
linked to an aim it pursues, which is “the attainment of justice” through putting forward a system 
of relations among men that “ensures certain standards determined by law.” This is what he 
called „Polis‟ or the political association that is the “most sovereign and inclusive” form of 
association. There is a power that stands out for combining might, power and authority. Might is 
to be used for defense against outsider threats and imposing conformity internally; power is 
exercised only in accordance with rules that legitimizes it.
24
 
Therefore, the idea of an entity possessing power and authority necessary for human 
association is not new. And it is not a “pure phenomenon of authority”; in other words, it is not 
all about physical control. It has to enjoy a degree of legitimacy to enjoy this authority.  It is 
endowed with a legitimate right to perform such a function, despite the type of organization. 
Different societies have put forward different ways of internal governance and means of social 
control, but such a diversity does not mean there is something in common, governability. The 
Greek thought that an entity controlling the process of governance and performing the function 
of social control justifies its existence in providing public goods. Aristotle said that in such a 
„city state,‟ and in it only, can humans enjoy “good life.” 25   
 Roman philosophers also had their conception of the state emphasizing law as the main 
constituent element of the state. It is not the “bearer of ultimate values” as Aristotle viewed.  
Cicero, the Roman lawyer, philosopher and constitutionalist, treated the state in his book, De Re 
Publica (On the Republic) as “a partnership in law” (consensus iuris) and not common interest 
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alone (utiliatis communion) that makes a people into a state (res republica).”  However, this law 
is not aimed at a certain end, regulating public life and inter-human relationships but rather a 
“natural” law suitable for all nations at all times. The lawyers of Imperial Rome in fact came up 
with (ius publicum) or the “public law.” They introduced all the rules that organize the 
distribution of power in society representing the essence of the state; they also elaborated the 
function and the rules of governance within social institutions. 
26
 
The term “state,” however, owes its existence to Nicolo Machiavelli. The term came from 
the word, "status" meaning the prestige or social status of people, namely the ruling figure. 
However, Machiavelli used the term "state" or "lo stato" to be "synonymous, not only with the 
prince himself, but with the character of the political regime, the geographical area over which 
sovereign authority was claimed and maintained, and the very institutions of government 
required to preserve such authority."
27
  The distinction between “the state” and the “prince” or 
the ruler was very clear in his earliest book, The Discourses. In his analysis of the different forms 
of government, Machiavelli distinguished between the “happy” state and the “unhappy” ones. 
The happy state is that enjoys a high level of institutional stability; it is a state where there are 
long lasting rules and laws “without deterioration and without any dangerous disturbance.” An 
unhappy one is one where there is a challenge to the rules that people in that state have been 
following. “Men will accept no new law altering the institutions of their state, unless the 
necessity for such a change be demonstrated.” The state to Machiavelli, is about “the order of 
things.” 28 that is totally different from the form of government responsible for running state 
affairs. There are three forms of government, monarch, aristocracy and democracy. They are 
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methods to merely methods of running the state. “Those who give its institutions to a State have 
resource to one or other of these three.” 29 Unlike The Discourses, Machiavelli‟s other treatise, 
The Prince, is a manual for rulers, Lorenzo De‟Medici, to govern and restore order in the chaotic 
society in Florence after the fall of the republic 1512.  In this work, Machiavelli gave up on his 
democratic ideals of stable institutions to help rulers consolidate personalized rule of a prince 
and therefore, authoritarianism.
30
 He believed that a strong personalized rule could restore order.  
  Then, it was first with Dante who introduced the terms "lo stato franco" referring to the 
"political authority regulating the public affairs of an independent community or 
'commonwealth'" as distinct from the ruler's power. Jean Boddin and Hobbes also viewed the 
state as "truly separate from the powers of the ruler and the ruled."
31
 Boddin argued that what 
gives political power its special characteristic is the use of force in the name, or on the bases of 
law, i.e., of a binding standard of regular procedure.” He labeled the ultimate location where 
power emanates, the power to legally command and not commanded by others, sovereignty. It is 
sovereignty that distinguished the state from any other form of human association. Accordingly, 
it is the supreme arbiter in society.  Now scholar has ever denied the existence of a governing 
authority.  
Rousseau, however, recognized that sovereignty is not vested in the government or the 
body governing the nation. The government is mere “exercise” of sovereignty that might have a 
distorted view of what the „public interest‟ is. He ascribed sovereignty to a fantastic abstract 
being called “the General Will.” That „Will‟ is not “the sum of all wills,” but rather the “sum of 
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all differences” forming a general moral code. That moral code does not reflect what the public 
wants or what they think is good for them. The Will or the binding code lies, as Rousseau spelt 
it, “in people‟s hearts,” and that cannot be corrupted but people in general could become 
deceived. Rousseau‟s perceives the sovereignty as something that transcends the passing of time 
and the changes in the wills of different social forces. 
32
 That moral code does not reflect what 
the public wants or what they think is good for them. The Will or the binding code lies, as 
Rousseau spelt it, “in people‟s hearts,” and that cannot be corrupted. The General Will is not the 
government; the act of governance is the “exercise of this Will,” which implies that the 
government does not enjoy the sovereignty. It is something else that does; an abstract being that 
is embodies an unchanging spirit or Idea of a community.  
Hegel perceived the state as an abstract idea that manifests itself in a „state‟ and develops 
into administrative apparatuses. The state represents the “essential bond of political union” with 
the ultimate aim of achieving “universal happiness.”33 The state is the idea of “unity of the 
general and the particular,” that ends up manifesting itself into a “state. This idea further 
develops forming its own apparatuses and different forms. 
34
  
Marx refused Hegel‟s concept of state as the „ideal collective citizen‟ and thought it is 
“pure mystification” on the part of Hegel. 35 He viewed capitalist state as an instrument of 
control by the bourgeoisie. It reflects its interests only and its characteristics are only a reflection 
of the ongoing class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The state exists to 
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preserve the exploitative relations of production in the capitalist system
36
. Other Marxist 
scholars, Nicos Polantzas argued that the state enjoys a degree of autonomy from the 
bourgeoisie. It is a situation where the state, although it serves their interests, it also could stand 
against the bourgeoisie protecting them from themselves in case they increase the level of 
oppression against the proletariat. In this case, the state could become above the society. The 
state could be defined in terms of its components, specifying the three major authorities, 
legislative, judiciary and executive. However, it draws clear-cut boundaries between state and 
society as if they were separate entities.  
Emile Durkheim defines the state in terms of representation. He argues that the state is 
the "supreme authority endowed with sovereign powers." It is the "organizing center" of the 
"secondary groups" where representatives of these secondary communities along with state 
officials "work out" "acts of volition.
37
" The state exists to represent a collective consciousness. 
In this sense, democracy is a precondition for stateness, which is not a viable argument. 
Democracy and representation are modern phenomenon. Durkheim‟s argument assumes that the 
state has emerged only with the emergence of the representation, which is not true. It is not 
possible to argue that undemocratic states like Egypt, China, who have a long history of supreme 
authority acting for the other secondary communities, are not states. In addition, he ignored 
dominance, power and control, the basic agreed-upon conceptions associated to the state.  
Similarly, both Lock and Hobbs dealt with the state as only a regime that reflects the 
existing ongoing power struggles within society. Hobbs argued that the state is either “an 
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assembly of men” or “one man” entrusted to curb the human inclinations to violate others‟ rights. 
A governing group or person would be responsible for keeping them in check. Lock argued that 
the state is also a group of humans entrusted to protection of the individual property.  
This line of thinking assumes that the state only mirrors the existing power struggles in 
society. In time, a whole new wave of scholarly work has equated the state with the governing 
regime only. One often reads works where authors attack the state for being oppressive. It is the 
regime that uses the state apparatus to increase his power. Such reduction of the concept of 
stateness has resulted into a distorted view of how society works, where power lies and where 
the potential for change are. It overlooks the real complexity of socio-political phenomenon. 
Max Weber 
Weber introduced a unique and more concrete method of looking at the „state.‟ To 
Weber, the state is not a mirror reflecting power struggles within society and totally dependent 
on it; it is not a regime or a government imposing rules and forcing events to happen; and it is 
not only an abstract idea of a „collective citizen‟ or a „General Will.” He acknowledged the 
abstractness of the idea of the state, but pinpointed its manifestations in the real world. The state 
has two unique elements, use of force and legitimacy in a rational bureaucratized mode of 
governance. 
In his long and detailed treaties, Economy and Society, Weber mentioned the word, state, 
only near the end of his work. He analyzed the different types of socio-economic orders. It is the 
political community, or the state, that is the most advanced forms of social order.  
28 
 
Weber and Challengers 
Weber perceived the state it in terms of its modus operandi. He refused all functional 
definitions, and argued that there is no specific function or "task" that "one could say has always 
been exclusive and peculiar to those associations which are designated as political ones."
38
 
Therefore, the most viable and least contested definition would focus on the mechanisms not the 
functions themselves, and at the core of these mechanisms, the use of violence or coercion. The 
mode of operation is the common element that no political community lacks. Other than that, 
different states could assume different tasks. To Weber, the state is the "human community that 
successfully claims the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory."
39
  
This community is a "political community" as long as its "social action is aimed at 
subordinating to orderly domination by the participants a 'territory' and the conduct of the 
persons within it through readiness to resort to physical force." However, this does not mean a 
dichotomy between state and society where the state knees society. The state is a procuress of 
enforcement within society.  
 Along with a territory and physical force, Weber requires a level of "social action" on the 
part of the inhabitants of the territory," the existence of which distinguishes "a political 
community" from a "traditional one." A "political community," as distinct from a traditional one, 
exists when it has value systems that justify its possession of power. However, in traditional 
societies, relations of order and internal regulation owe their legitimacy to the economic relations 
predominant in the community. He advocates "regulation" of the "interrelations" of those who 
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live in a specified territory. 
40
 In short, Weber refused the dichotomy between state and society 
and focused, on defining the state, on the issue of governability versus anarchy. 
Despite attempts to rebel against the Weberian definition, all other definitions have not 
deviated much from it. In fact, they merely spelled it out and broke it to its components. Among 
the primary challengers are Anthony Giddens and Joel Migdal, but neither deviate from the 
essence of the Weberian argument.  
Giddens undermined Weber‟s concept of "legitimacy" and substituted it with a 
description of the dynamics of social domination. Rule is all about a power struggle where there 
are no explicit winners or losers; it is about a complex relation of autonomy as well as mutual 
dependence "sustained by the routine practices that those in subordinate positions employ to 
influence the activities of others." The state's function is only to protect the "universal qualities 
upon which it is predicated." It is "a political organization whose rule is territorially ordered and 
which is able to mobilize the means of violence to sustain that rule," excluding the words 
"legitimacy" and "success." 
41
  
Joel Migdal however, provided a better critique of the Weberian definition, but did not 
deviate from it though. He argues that the association between enforceability and stateness has 
led research to sterile paths. The ability to enforce rule of law was an 'ideal type' or a standard 
against which state's weakness/strength is measured. However, Weber‟s use of the term 
“successful” to describe state enforcement role rendered Migdal‟s argument flawed. Migdal 
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argued that Weber's definition assumes that the state is the only responsible for creating and 
enforcing the rules, underestimating the "rich negotiation, interaction, and resistance that occur 
in every human society." This leads researchers to a dead lock, providing no way to theorize 
about arenas of competing sets of rules," other than making classifications of states as weak, 
strong, failed or even none-states. 
42
 However, Weber never underestimated the state -societal 
interaction and conflict, and that is why one finds these very fluid terms, "legitimate" and 
"successfully" without dwelling more into how is it that a state could be "successful" and what 
makes it‟s the state's use of force 'legitimate' or not. This is where Weber introduces (though he 
only mentions) the critical multi-faceted and very general terms that comprise all the societal 
interaction that Migdal talks about. Migdal defines the state as a "field of power" marked by the 
use and threat of violence and shaped by, first, the image of a coherent, controlling organization 
in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and second, the 
actual practices of its multiple parts."
43
 Migdal does not deviate from the Weberian assertion that 
the state has the monopoly of use of force. However, the "success" of states to enforce rule of 
law depends on the other concept introduced by Weber, especially "legitimacy." 
   Migdal provided a good method of analyzing the reasons for state's ability/inability to 
apply rule of law through examining the "image" or the normative view of the state as well as the 
"actual practice." The relationship between both elements of the state may in fact give insight to 
the reasons why a state could be considered strong or weak. Nazih Ayubi also challenges the 
Weberian definition, but in fact, he adds to it the way Migdal did. Both
44
 delved into the sources 
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of consent-generation. While the latter introduced the idea of the "image" that is culturally and 
historical generated, Ayubi adopted Gramsci's idea of "hegemony" to replace Weber's idea of 
legitimacy. Gramsci adds to the Marxist conception of the state arguing that the state is the 
"'entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only 
justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom 
it rules.''' In other words, the dominant classes, along with establishing an entity that monopolize 
the use of coercion in the country, they create the ideological "hegemony" to justify or 
'legitimize' their dominance through this entity, the state.  
State Capacity 
Despite all the different conceptions of 'the state" discussed earlier, state capacity is 
referred to in the literature to mean the degree to which 'the state,' as an apparatus whose main 
dynamic of rule regardless of the type of function, is able to 'enforce.' If the state is incapable of 
performing its function of governability through use of force; this means it has 'failed' in 
justifying its mere purpose. Scholars tend to locate states along a wide spectrum of strength and 
weakness. At the far end of this spectrum are state that totally irrelevant to the residents of the 
territory it should govern and a state that is capable of kneeing the society. However, none of 
these two extreme ideal types exists. States exist “in” societies, as Migdal argued naming his 
book. It is an 'autonomous' "entity" in the sense that its institutions have an effect on social 
outcomes. The pluralist paradigm, naively, perceive the state as merely a reflection of the social 
interaction. However, as argued earlier, institutions have a life of their own, and they alter the 
choices for different social actors. All officials who take a position in an institution feel there are 
powers and constraints on his/her behavior to act. Holding office is "different" as Huntington 
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rightfully argued.
45
 He argues that reality in public office imposes constraints on the behavior of 
public officials that he/she may not have considered. The process of decision making and 
implementation is a complex process that has a lot of unintended consequences. Sometimes the 
official‟s will and possession of the know-how is not enough to have a certain policy 
implemented. The state is both autonomous from as well as dependent on society.  
State capacity is about governability and the degree to which people abide by rule of law. 
Violation of laws is a universal phenomenon. However, sometimes, it is inflated or systemized to 
the extent that people lose trust in the institution or even refuse it altogether. They lose faith in 
the potential that the state institution will get their affairs done as they want them to be done and 
legally. This loss of trust means a failure to fulfill its institutional purposes. As a result, the state 
could turn into a manager of the phenomenon instead of applying rule of law. The better the 
manager, the more stable the system seems to be and vice versa. The efficiency of the system 
boils down to the personality of the ruler, manager, employee or police officer, which results into 
a very dangerous phenomenon, personalization of rule and the state-instability associated with it. 
It is a situation where efficiency of employees, weather top government officials or the smallest 
employee in an institution, is not stable and depends on their own sense of morality rather than 
an impersonal system that provides stability and lack of volatility. Therefore, the determinant of 
state capacity would be how much formally institutionalized it is on paper and in reality. 
Accordingly, laws could be considered the embodiment of such an abstract entity, „the state.‟ If 
the state‟s modus operandi has a power, this force should be governed by certain laws. One 
cannot study the state‟s ability to govern, use force, without reference to the laws it is trying to 
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impose, how they are socially perceived, how they were made and how they were ratified, not 
only how they are applied. By looking at the whole picture of law making and then law 
application and the societal feedback to these laws, and/or government practices, one can 
understand state weakness or strength better. The state is not about “law and order.” It is about 
„rule of law‟ for „order.‟ 
By definition, governance includes two processes, putting forward the rules and 
implementing them. Weber, in his discussion of social order, outlined the different modes of 
governance, the sources of law as well as the methods of implementation. Both, the rules and 
enforcement require an essential element, a degree of consent or legitimacy to be stable. Weber 
categorized obedience to rules to three degrees of order. When the violation of laws or 
contravention becomes the rule, the order enjoys mere expediency that is far from being stable. It 
is a state of failure to enforce the common norms and rules. There is also obedience that comes 
out of mere habit. However, it is less stable and durable than a legitimate rule because it is 
voluntary. A legitimate order is the only type worthy of the label „social order.” 46  
Rule of law and “The State” 
The Concept of Rule of Law 
The use of the concept „rule of law‟ is problematic. It is a highly debatable concept that 
means different things to different people; however, the disagreement over a precise definition 
for „rule of law‟ does not mean abandoning the analytical utility of the term. The philosophical 
literature on „rule of law‟ does not provide a consensus on how to define the term. There are two 
perspectives through which one could perceive rule of law. The first is end-based. It could mean 
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the commitment of the state to “provide its citizens with legal remedies against unlawful exertion 
of state power.” 47 It could also be viewed as   
"a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. 
They enshrine and uphold the political and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights 
over the last half a century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing 
and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system, including courts, 
prosecutors, and police, are reasonable fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and most 
important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the 
law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding."
48
 
This view emphasizes the moral purpose or concept of law emphasizing issues like civil 
liberties and constraints on political power.  It has to be associated with the protection of 
citizens‟ rights from the abusive power of the state. This is how legal philosophers tend to view 
rule of law, and this is where most criticisms to the terms arises. Some scholars argue that rule of 
law in this sense is a western-centric concept and not suitable for some societies. 
 Other scholars such as Michael Oakeshott and Judith Shklar use it to simply mean “good 
governance” where the state puts forward laws to properly govern behavior in a society to create 
predictability. They tend to highlight “the institutional attributes believed necessary to actuate 
the rule of law such as comprehensive laws, well-functioning courts, and trained law 
enforcement agencies.” 49 Some scholars refer to the later process as “rule by law.” In other 
words, while the concept of „rule of law‟ emphasizes civil liberties and constraints on state 
behavior to protect individuals, the concept of „rule by law‟ emphasizes the process of order 
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irrespective of the moral content or the end of the law and its role in protecting individual rights 
and freedoms. In this sense, „rule by law‟ is a universal concept existing in different societies 
throughout history. In fact, Abu Bakr, Prophet Mohamed‟s successor, in his first speech after 
being appointed a “Khalif” put forward the basic rules of governance stating that „Shari’a‟ Law 
is the constitution that should govern people‟s and as well as the ruler‟s behavior; any deviance 
from the law is punishable.  
In both cases, there are common elements in both perspectives that emphasize equality 
before law and law enforcement. Even the goal-oriented approach to „rule of law‟ emphasizes 
some common elements such as clarity of laws, equality before laws and law enforcement. 
Therefore, the intellectual debate surrounding this concept of rule of law is irrelevant to the topic 
at hand. All societies throughout history aspire for a certain order to provide them with a degree 
of predictability and stability, regardless of the nature of this order. The entire political process is 
all about trying to change the institutions, the rule of the game, the order that forms expectations 
and defines the criteria for reward and punishment. As mentioned earlier, law is not an end in 
itself. It is a means to an end, order. A second problem associated with this definition is ignoring 
the importance of the institutions of enforcement, which is the focus of the second perspective. It 
describes the institutions necessary for a society to enjoy rule of law. Such a view of rule of law 
makes researchers embark upon "institutional modeling" or copying of Western institutions of 
the judiciary and police forces ignoring the purposes of law which are culturally, historically and 
politically specific. 
One can argue that violation of law is a universal phenomenon, even in the most 
democratic and developed countries of the West. However, sometimes, it is inflated or 
systemized to the extent that people, as mentioned earlier, lose trust in the state institution, or 
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never pay heed to it at all. This loss of trust means a failure to fulfill its institutional purposes. 
When distrust becomes a phenomenon, the state suffers a deep problem. When the phrase 
“mafeesh dawla” or “there is no state” becomes popular among a big proportion of the 
population that there is a problem, this is exactly what is going on in Egypt. The research does 
not assume that there could be a perfect system where rule of law is properly upheld. However, 
there is a wide spectrum of strengths/weakness of state ability to uphold rule of law. 
Unfortunately, in Egypt, there is a situation where the state gives away its power to the rule of 
customary forms of conflict resolution. 
Is it a question of Law making or law application? 
When discussing law enforcement or the capacity of state to enforce law, two issues are brought 
to the surface, the validity of the law itself and methods of enforcement. 
No organizational structure is capable of functioning without public consent or 
legitimacy. There has to be a wide support and compliance on the part of individual citizens and 
social actors. Therefore, a law and any enforcement apparatus are both useless if they are 
incapable of generating compliance. Weber argued that “submission to an order is almost always 
determined by a variety of interests and by a mixture of adherence to tradition and belief in 
legality, unless it is a case of entirely new regulation.”50 The law could be conforming to a 
custom or convention; that generates compliance. The law could be new and revolutionary, but 
needs to have a charismatic leader propagating for it; that generates compliance too. There is also 
compliance in return for economic and/or material interest. Different laws generate different 
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causes of compliance or rejection. How much of that compliance is due to rational reasons, 
customs or interest affect the degree of legitimacy and therefore law stability. 
Weber rightfully argues that custom and personal advantages are “purely effectual” and 
not “sufficiently reliable” a basis for domination. However, there are three major legitimate 
sources of authority, rational grounds, traditional grounds and charismatic grounds. The success 
of a legal order relies, not necessarily on one of them only, but on the “probability” that, to a 
certain extent, “the appropriate attitudes will exist” and manifest themselves into the people‟s 
daily conduct.  
51
 
While law making is a political process, law enforcement should not be one in modern 
states. Police should be a neutral entity whose job is to enforce the law promulgated by the 
legislative body and the court verdicts. However, law enforcement agencies‟ assuming a political 
role reflects either inability to enforce rule of law or unwillingness to do so. In both cases, 
respect for the state and therefore state power is compromised.  
The police is an “organized civil force” responsible for the maintenance of public peace, 
safety and order.”52 It is a function necessary for civilized coexistence among citizens. Law 
enforcement agents are endowed with the power to use violence in the form of “collecting and 
communicating intelligence affecting public peace,” preventing offences to the public peace, 
arresting and detecting offenders and eventually bringing them to justice. Police, all over the 
globe, have a wide spectrum of functions such as protecting life and property, enforcing the 
criminal law, investigating criminal offenses, patrolling public places, advising about crime 
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prevention, conducting prosecutions, sentencing for minor offenses, maintaining order and 
decorum in public places by directing, interrupting, and warning, guarding persons and facilities, 
regulating traffic, controlling crowds, regulating and suppressing vice ( a function that is adopted 
in the U.S.), counseling juveniles ( in Netherlands), gathering information about political and 
social life ( as in France), monitoring elections ( as in Italy), conducting counter-espionage 
(France), issuing ordinances ( as in Germany), inspecting premises (Germany), issuing permits 
and licenses ( as in Britain), serving summonses (in Norway), supervising jails (in Norway), 
impounding animals and lost property ( as in Britain), advising members of the public and 
referring them to other agencies ( in Scotland), caring for the incapacitated (in the US.), 
promoting community crime-prevention activities (Scotland) and participating in policy councils 
of government (as in France).
53
 
These are different varieties of functions that police could and do perform in different 
countries. However, in Western Europe and North America, no police organization does all these 
functions. Countries differ in the attention given to some functions more than others. The 
“critical” question is the amount of attention given to each of these functions by the police at 
different times. However, the police apparatus in Egypt does all of these functions in addition to 
having specialized police covering different walks of life such as a special police force covering 
electricity, a police force specializing in tourism let alone the authoritarian function of 
monitoring opposition and activists. Therefore, the “neutrality” meant in this piece of research 
means having an equal distance from different political forces. It must not be “instrumentalized” 
by a certain group at the expense of others. Its main and only function is to uphold rule of law  
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Conclusion 
The main obstacle to studying state capacity is the theoretical debates over the meaning 
of basic concepts of the “state” and “state capacity.” The different definitions and perspectives of 
the state have influenced the way scholarly literature has attempted to explain social 
phenomenon. This piece of research argues that state capacity is closely associated with the 
ability to enforce rule of law through its executive arm. Rule of the law enforcement is the most 
important element of stateness across different fields, and it is the main determinant of state 
capacity. 
The concept of the “state” has evolved throughout centuries from being a synonym for 
the ruling class, a reflection of the power struggles within society, an abstract idea of a 
“collective citizen” or a “General Will,” to a more sophisticated definition that refused the 
dichotomy between the state and society, refused reducing the state to a mere ruling class, 
acknowledge the abstractness of the idea of the state but pinpoints its manifestations in the real 
world. That is the Weberian definition of the state as the human community which monopolizes 
the legitimate use of force emphasizing the issue of governability or the intensity of governance 
versus anarchy.  
The following analysis of governability in Egypt is based on the statist intuitionalist 
approach that is based on the assumption that there the state is a different structure of power that 
is capable of affecting and altering the outcomes of regime policies and societal choices.  
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CHAPTER II 
LAW AND CUSTOM 
Introduction: The Legal Design 
The relationship between custom and the legal apparatus is complex. It is naive to assume 
a dichotomous relationship between both. Custom is an integral part of the legal reality in Egypt. 
It is part of the Egyptian legal system as the second source of law and provides customary 
methods of adjudication that were adopted by the formal legal apparatus. It also plays a major 
role in conflict resolution in different regions inside Egypt due to its self-enforcing nature where 
the society as a whole makes sure rules are properly upheld. On the other hand, the state does not 
make an effort to reform the formal judicial system for people to resort to instead of customary 
means.  As a result, customary means of conflict resolution are widespread in different regions in 
Egypt. 
Customary Law as a Phase in the Evolution of Law 
Custom has always been the most important source of laws throughout history. In fact, 
the codification or writing of laws drew heavily and sometimes entirely from custom. Ancient 
laws drew heavily from custom such as the Code of Hammurabi in ancient Iraq (around the end 
of the seventeenth century B.C. 
54
and the Twelve Tables code. Hammurabi (1727-1686) did not 
codify all existing customs. He was more of a social reformer and legislator drafting some new 
laws and redefining some customs based on real-life cases. This is why the code included plenty 
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of hypothetical assumptions; many of the laws started with the prefix “summa” meaning “if.” 55 
The Twelve Tables Legal Code was one of the early attempts to create a code of law that drew 
heavily from custom in the Roman Empire around 455 B.C..  Each table covered the laws 
covering the procedure for courts and trials, debt, Rights of fathers over the family, inheritance 
laws, acquisition and possession, land rights, laws of injury, public law and sacred law in 
addition to two supplementary tables.  
In the year 621 B.C., the Draconian legal code emerged based on the old customs existing 
in Athens after waves of restlessness because the upper classes monopolized the knowledge of 
the law. However, the written law was only a comprehensive set of existing customary rules as 
they are written on paper for all citizens. The public was disappointed, as it was a mere 
formalization of the existing old class system and the harsh rules. 
56
 Because Dracon law is 
remarkably harsh, it was unsatisfactory to contemporaries. The fist historical attempt to rebel 
against existing customs and pushed for the redrafting of law was the writing of Solon law in the 
year 594 B.C.. The law was introduced after calls to refine the law to suit the general trend 
towards quality among different classes and freedom. It kept the established rules related to 
commerce, judicial procedures and other customs that were not subject to public rejection; 
however, it modified laws related slavery such as the enslavement of the insolvent and the 
bankrupt, inheritance such as limiting inheritance to the eldest son only, and it challenged the 
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fatherly right to own his children, sell them and own their property.  
57
 Accordingly, it is the first 
law that selectively codifies custom. 
58
 
Custom in Different Modern Legal Systems: Common Law and Statuary Law 
Systems 
 While one type of legal system, the Statuary Law system, may or may not rely on 
custom, Common Law System does. The difference between both systems lies in the authority 
promulgating the law. In the Common Law system prevalent in most Anglo-American systems, 
jurists rely on a mixture of statuary law put forward by the legislator, regulatory law put forward 
by the executive branch of government and „case law.‟ “Case law” is the body of writings 
explaining verdicts taken by judges in previous cases giving the reason behind these solutions. 
These interpretations can be cited as precedents other judges could use in future cases. Therefore, 
it places a great weight to judicial precedents and opinion of other jurists in the past. Such 
decisions have the power of statues. At the same time, courts are not absolutely bound by 
precedent. A great margin of freedom is left for the judge. On the other hand, Statuary or 
Regulatory Law system does not rely on legal precedents as statues. The only room for judicial 
activism
59
 is left for judges in interpreting the law not creating legal precedents that other future 
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judges could use as biding laws. Common law drives its authority form the customs and 
traditions that evolved over centuries and judges‟ interpretations to these customs. 60 
The Common-Law system is prevalent in England, United States and other countries 
colonized by Britain. However, statuary laws are prevalent in Europe and areas colonized by 
France and Spain. Egypt is one of those countries invaded by France from 1798-1801. Those 
three years left long-lasting effect on the Egyptian socio-political sphere; the legal system 
instituted by Napoleon constituted a hybrid between Shari’a law the Napoleonic civil code, and 
therefore, it is has a statue law system. However, custom plays a major role in the legal system. 
Custom in Egypt 
Custom plays a dual role in the formal legal system as a source of legislation as well as 
providing a method of adjudication.  The legislator in Egypt believes that custom can be a source 
of law that can strengthen the legal system by making up of the potential problems with the 
ordinary laws or statues. Furthermore, Egyptian law allowed for customary methods of 
adjudication and conflict resolution namely the customary forms of arbitration and 
reconciliation.  
To study the role custom plays in the Egyptian legal sphere, it is imperative to study it in 
the context of the broad legal design. The legal system is not only about rules and decisions put 
forward by a legislative entity. It is “a framework of institutions providing structures that form 
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the conditions of its workable existence and acceptance.
61
 Therefore, the legal system as an 
“institutional design” is not merely a set of laws. It includes the laws prevalent in a certain social 
setting as well as the means of adjudication. The legal design is two dimensional, substantive and 
procedural. The substantive dimension of the legal decision has to do with the nature of laws and 
the law-making process or as one of the major legal philosophers phrased
62, “Eunomics.” 63The 
procedural element is the process of adjudication or the judicial process itself. Therefore a better 
view of the role of custom could be reached if one analyzes customs as an institution or as a legal 
design in contrast to a formal legal design.  
Building on that concept, one can view both the formal legal system and the informal one 
as two different legal designs. The legal design could be both formal and customary. The formal 
legal system includes both the laws governing behavior in a society as well as the judicial 
process through which law is applied. Likewise, „custom‟ is two-dimensional, substantive and 
procedural. There is no agreed-upon definition for customary law. Custom may refer to the laws 
that are socially-generated or accepted, and that is the substantive dimension of customary law. It 
may also refer to the customary procedure or the customary process of adjudication or extra-legal 
forms of arbitration. Arbitration is an informal process aimed at resolving disputes by involving 
a third neutral party outside the state system. The first refers to the laws themselves. The second 
refers to the process whereby the laws are applied. The role played by customs in the Egyptian 
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legal reality cannot be reduced to such a shallow analysis. The legal/judiciary reality in Egypt is 
a result of interaction and sometimes conflict between and formal and an informal legal design. 
Custom as a Source of Legislation 
Custom is the second source of legislation in a hierarchy of power after laws by the 
parliament, Shari’a 64 and finally the principles of justice and natural law. „Custom” is often 
defined as “a practice that by its common adoption and long, unvarying habit has come to have 
the force of law,” “ the general rules and practices that have become generally adopted through 
unvarying habit and common use,” or “a record of all the established legal and quasi-legal 
practices within a community.”65  However, custom plays a bigger role in the Egyptian legal 
reality. All common definitions refer to the nature of the laws leaving aside one important part of 
custom, the customary process of adjudication in contrast to the formal the state-mediated 
means. In other words, law has both the procedural element along with the substantive one. 
When examining the role of custom, one cannot ignore the role played by custom in procedural 
law in addition to the substantive one.  
 Making law is not only a matter of procedure (i.e. the legislative process to issue a 
certain law); it is an outcome of complex philosophical, historical and socio-political factors.  
The end result of a legal system to Fuller was creating a “good order and workable social 
arrangements” and for that to be achieved, certain philosophical questions arise among which is 
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the question of “idealism” versus “pragmatism.” In other words, should the institutional design 
strive to achieve a normative goal like freedom or should the emphasis on the practical 
application of the law be the primary concern when formulating a legal order? Such a question is 
important to the study of the role of custom in law. Custom is one important source of laws all 
over the world. It is the different ways people have voluntarily/spontaneously and gradually 
developed over extended periods of time, which gives it certain advantages. First, it is so detailed 
that it covers all aspects that ordinary law does not cover. Second, it is self enforcing since 
people accepted it as a mode of behavior and rules for long.  
The Egyptian formal legal design gives custom a primary status. There are different 
sources of law in Egypt that follow a hierarchy of power. After the constitution, which is the 
primary source, judges are required to abide by that hierarchy when adjudicating. The first is 
legislation by the parliament, costumes, Islamic Jurisprudence (Shari‟a) and the rules and 
principles of natural law and justice. If a judge cannot find a solution to the case at hand in 
legislation, he is required to check if there is a pre-existing custom that does. If not, he can resort 
to Shari‟a Law, and if not, he can finally resort to rules of natural law and justice. This is the 
order according to Article 1 of the Civil Code.  
While legislation is the most important source of law, “U’rf” or custom is the set of rules 
or principles that are socially accepted and people in a certain community get used to abiding by 
them. However, the mere fact that a certain custom is widely followed does not necessarily give 
it the power of a law unless it is widely viewed as obligatory. People must not believe that they 
are freed to depart from it whenever they choose or to over serve it only as a matter of courtesy 
or moral obligation. It has to be associated with a sense of legal obligation. It is also associated 
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with a punishment for non-compliant parties. For a custom to enjoy the power of law, it has to 
have certain characteristics. It has to be general; however, in the case of customary law, the 
subjects of the law do not have to be the general population; subjects to a custom may be 
members of a certain group.  Such a group may be determined geographically like the customs 
governing relations in a certain territory like a clan or tribe or a certain guild. Second, it has to be 
an established rule or principle that people have been following for long time. There is no 
specific determinate of that “length” or a specific definition for what “long” time is, but it has to 
be long enough to become entrenched and socially accepted as a given. In court, it is left entirely 
to the judge to evaluate the criteria that would make a custom qualify to become binding or not. 
Third, a custom can enjoy the power of a law only if it is widely accepted, and subjects to it have 
to believe that such a custom is obligatory the violation of which requires punishment, feelings 
that also evolve gradually and over a long period of time. Also, it is left for the judge in court to 
decide the time- factor involved. Forth, customs are self-enforced.  By definition customs are 
powerful irrespective of the existence of an entity enforcing them and people have been willingly 
compliant. Customary law also assumes that subjects to the law are well informed about the 
content of the custom or the rule itself. However, legally, a custom cannot violate a law. In short, 
customs are an important source that a judge uses to reach a solution.
66
 
For these practical reasons and like other formal legal systems, the Egyptian law draws 
heavily from custom making it the second sources of law for both the legislator and the judge. 
Custom both complements and assists the ordinary law. Some customary rules can complement 
some elements of the law that the ordinary law may not cover adding details. There are plenty of 
examples in different laws. In commercial law, custom plays a significant role more than any 
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other field. Due to the fast pace of changes in the international commercial field, ordinary law 
may be restrictive and slow to be issued by the legislator. Therefore, jurists usually resort to the 
customary ways of doing things instead of going through the official legislative machine to 
handle such details. In fact, commercial law itself refers in many of its statues to custom for 
judges to use, and sometimes it gives it priority over ordinary law. In addition, customs are the 
main source of law in commerce. For example, a set of customary complementary rules were 
binding in court along with the existing commercial law until the Law number 17 for the year 
1999 (Law 17/1999) was promulgated where such customs were recognized and codified to 
become part of the ordinary law. 
67
 In civil law, customary rules play a less significant of a role. 
However, civil laws draw from custom in areas related to personal affairs. For example, a custom 
stipulates that house furniture is the property of the wife. This is a long established social rule. 
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With regard to administrative laws, a judge can resort to custom in areas not covered by ordinary 
law.  
There are different ways where a custom can help or assist the ordinary law address 
certain points or cases that the law may not have addressed.  A custom may help the legislator 
with the phrasing of the statue such as the laws governing the rent system. Custom may also 
assist the legislator in explaining the law itself by illuminating the motives behind a certain 
action. Judges can resort to custom in explaining contracts by illuminating the motives of each 
party. Custom may also assist the judge in reaching a solution in issues when the law does not 
cover certain issue and it may explicitly demand the judge to refer to custom. 
69
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Only criminal law does not draw from custom. There is an established rule in the 
Egyptian criminal system that stipulates “no crime without a law,” which is a custom in itself. In 
other words, a judge cannot hold a citizen accountable for a crime unless the crime is stipulated 
in the ordinary law promulgated by the legislative authority. The rationale behind this idea is that 
crimes are punishable with harsh measures that can take away from the perpetrator‟s freedom 
and maybe his life in case of a death sentence.  
While the hierarchical character of the legal design may nullify any decision based on a 
custom that violates a law, there are exceptions to this rule. The law itself may allow parties to a 
contract violate the law if they agree to do so, but that is limited to certain laws that are not 
peremptory (Peremptory norms).  
Custom as Judicial Procedure 
 Not only is custom the second source of legislation, but also at a certain point in history, 
it was institutionalized to the extent of establishing a court for custom, and the law gave room for 
arbitration as an extra-legal method of adjudication. In 1980, a court whose sole purpose is to 
protect customary values was established.  
Courts Based on Custom 
Not only did the Egyptian state recognize custom as a source of law, it also established a 
court that handles only issues related to customs. Shortly before his assassination, the former 
president of Egypt, Anwar Al Sadat, established in the year 1980, what is called “the Court of 
Basic (Lofty) Principles” or „Mahkamat Al Keyam’ (Law 105 /1980) and the issuance of “Law of 
Protection from Bad Conduct” or „Kanun Hemayat Al Keyam Men Al E’eib‟ ( يه نيقلا تياوح ىوًاق
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بيعلا) that is indented to “protect the basic values of society.” 70The law refers to a vague, ill-
defined and wide spectrum of customary rules and religious rules giving them a label “the 
genuine character of the Egyptian family” that needs to be preserved. That character “embodies 
the values and traditions,” and protecting such values would “protect national unity and social 
peace.” However, in 2008, law number 194 was issued to cancel the court of Protection of Bad 
Conduct and preventing the court of Lofty Principles from accepting more cases as a step to 
cancel the court altogether.
71
 
Arbitration  
Not only laws can have custom as their source but also methods of adjudication. 
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution “involving one or more neutral third parties who are 
usually agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.”72 It may be 
incorporated into the state legal system, as sometimes it is legally recognized provided that it 
does not violate existing laws. It could be compulsory or required by law or forced by law on the 
parties; it could be voluntary by agreement of the parties. Or it could be a “final-offer 
arbitration” in which both parties are required to submit their final offer to the arbitrator who can 
choose one of them only. However, sometimes, it takes place outside the state apparatus entirely 
such as many customary tribunals cases in Upper Egypt and Sinai. 
                                                          
70
 UNDP. Arab Legal Database. http://www.arab-
ipu.org/pdb/RelatedArticlesGvnSPName.asp?SPName=CHRN&StructuredIndexCode=&LawBookID=2112200145
61810&Year1=&Year2=&YearGorH= 
71
 Law 194/2008, Bawabat Al Tashree’at Al Masreya 
72
 Garner, Bryan A. ed. Black‟s Law Dictionary: West Group Publishing Group, 2nd edition, 2001, P. 41. 
 
51 
 
By definition, the judicial system is based on the idea of “arbitrating” between different 
parties in pursuit of justice, and the history of arbitration can be traced to the history of the 
development of adjudication. Arbitration is well known since ancient times, and to be more 
specific, before the beginning of the state system that took over that mission.  
  Arbitration as a form of adjudication has been spreading all over the world in civil 
as well as commercial dealings, but it is not perceived as a challenge to state authority. In such 
instances, arbitration has various advantages. First, it saves the time wasted in the formal legal 
process in court. Second, it provides different parties with the secrecy needed for the agreements 
they reach. The fact that it takes place outside of the state system is not considered a challenge to 
the state system though. The mainstream opinion in this regards, especially in the business 
world, is that as long as adversaries reach a solution they are both satisfied with and that the 
solution to the conflict does not violate state laws, arbitration proves to be an efficient dispute 
settlement mechanism. This is why, normally, different parties agree to sign an official document 
proving reconciliation. By definition, arbitration is a process outside state apparatus; however, 
the state may in certain cases recognize it. If the agreement reached does not violate the law, the 
court system will recognize it and it becomes binding and mandatory. In Egypt, the state 
recognizes arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism (Law 27/1994). However, this law is 
intended to facilitate the legal process related to commercial cases since the adjudication process 
in Egypt takes a long time ; a single case could take years due to the limited number of judges 
and the huge amount of cases they work on every day. Arbitration is becoming the method of 
adjudication most favored internationally in a globalizing world where corporations run 
transnational businesses in different states with different legal systems. Gradually, international 
business arbitration is becoming the norm in inter-related markets. Since each country has its 
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own legal system and formal adjudication process, businesses tend to resort to international 
arbitration tribunals.  
 Arbitration, in the modern legal sense, does not necessarily mean adjudication outside of 
the state system. Domestic legal systems across the globe that recognize arbitration “does not 
leave the entire process without judicial intervention; state formal judicial system has some 
authority over arbitration processes to guarantee a just conflict resolution.” 73 Accordingly, 
arbitration, as recognized by the Egyptian constitution and various laws, does not violate the 
domestic legal system and is allowed under the condition of conforming to existing ordinary 
laws promulgated by the legislative authority.  
It is also recognized by courts in certain cases, but it is never recognized in criminal cases. This 
is where arbitration becomes not only outside the state apparatus but also illegal.  
Arbitration in criminal cases is recognized as an exception in felonies not the norm. 
Article 18 of the Egyptian Criminal Procedural Code stipulates that there could be reconciliation 
in felonies where the punishment is limited to the payment of fines and procedural violations. 
Reconciliation in manslaughter is also recognized by court if the victim‟s family agrees. 74 
However, in a case of a deliberate murder, for example, the law does not recognize any 
reconciliation, as it is the public right to prosecute the murderer. Such cases are prevalent in 
Upper Egypt and tha’r crimes. All interviewees said that when they settle a murder case, if 
reconciliation is reached, witnesses nullify the case before the court by giving false testimonies 
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and forge evidence. This is where arbitration becomes completely in violation of the state 
system. 
Theories Explaining the Power of Custom  
There are different theories explaining custom‟s power to be self-enforced. Some argue 
that the legislator‟s acknowledgment of custom or „U’rf’ as a source of law; however, such an 
argument wrongly assumes that for a certain legal norm or law to be effective, it has to be state-
approved, which is not necessarily true. In fact, customary law sometimes proves to be more 
powerful than ordinary state laws are. Schools of thought however attribute the power of custom 
to social acceptance and respect. By definition, customs are the norms and rules that different 
social actors to govern relations among members. If such rules are put forward and have been 
followed for a long time by a certain community, it makes perfect sense for that same society to 
adhere to these laws. This is how custom derives its self-enforcing nature even though some of 
these customs are discriminatory from the modern legal sense.
75
 While a citizen can evade law, 
he/she cannot evade the punishment of customary laws. The whole society is the agent 
responsible for enforcing customs, and therefore, “an outlaw” who violated a custom cannot 
survive in an environment that rejects him/her. Even the power structure inside the village is not 
as efficient as when ordinary members of society collaborate to enforce such rules. For example, 
if someone is caught stealing, ordinary citizens catch the criminal and keep him until the entity in 
power, be it the head of a family, an influential citizen in the village or the police in some 
instances, take him to deal with the crime. Given that the village community is so closed and 
people know each other, the potential for escaping them is very limited. However, a citizen can 
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evade state law if the surrounding environment allows him/her to do so. The only agency 
responsible for executing the legal verdict is the police. If the society rejects cooperation with 
police, it is easy for an outlaw to escape legal punishment. In other words, customary law is more 
powerful.  
 Egyptian Judiciary Provides no Proper Alternative 
The formal legal system in Egypt suffers serious problems that drive people to resort to 
customary forms of conflict resolution. One of the most important ailments of the Egyptian 
formal legal system is the slow judicial process. Cases may take years and sometimes up to 10 
years in court. In an interview with one of the lawyers in the Upper Egyptian governorate, Al 
Menya, Ashraf Al Orba‟a, he said that a judge may have up to 200 cases to examine per day.” 
Since this is practically impossible, cases get postponed for hundreds and thousands of times. As 
a result, people resort to customary forms of conflict resolution instead of the slow formal 
judicial procedures. 
In addition to the slow judicial procedures, the impartiality of the judicial system is 
sometimes questionable. Judges suffer from the same Economic difficulties a large sector of the 
Egyptian public suffers from. “The living conditions of judges have certainly declined due to the 
successive flows of inflation and despite the successive raises in their wages.” 76 The Egyptian 
public opinion has witnessed some “deviations of few judges.” 77 It is also notable that salaries of 
judges are controlled by the executive branch of government through the Ministry of Justice. In 
order to acquire and keep public trust in the judiciary, there is a need to raise the financial 
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standard of judges. The state‟s lack of interest in increasing the living standard of judges as well 
as their number to cover the need for judges raise questions related to the will to reform the 
system. 
Custom in Egypt: Mapping Customary Law in Egypt: Areas where it is Entrenched 
Most 
Egypt is one of the countries where customary law and customary tribunals are prevalent 
and powerful despite Egypt‟s strong legal heritage. Customary law is dominant in areas where 
there is a nomadic and Bedouin presence such as Sinai, Upper Egypt and the Eastern and 
Western Deserts; customary tribunals are also very common in the Delta region. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom that suggests that the customary legal system is dominant only in remote 
areas that are away of the centralized political authority in big cities such as Cairo and 
Alexandria, customary tribunals are widespread in the densely populated cities and villages of 
the Delta.  
A customary tribunal is a gathering of a number of well-known influential prominent 
figures in the community known as “judges” or “arbitrators” (Muhakemeen- ييوكحه) held to end 
an animosity between two or more families. The cause of animosity could range from a family 
problem, conflicts over land, money, parliamentary elections, ordinary fights and commercial 
issues. Problems are usually aggravated when the conflicts result into injuries or blood spilt.   
Customary forms of conflict resolutions differ from a region to the other, and each has its 
own distinct characteristics and rule in terms of both the structure. While this chapter will 
describe some of these tribunals, the next one will focus on the different customary means of 
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conflict resolution in Upper Egypt and state-community interaction in two Upper Egyptian 
villages.  
Delta Region  
  The Egyptian Delta is one of the regions where use of customary tribunals to settle 
conflicts are prevalent and state sponsored. In an interview with one famous judge, Sheikh 
Mohamed Oudah, he described who the customary judge is, how the tribunals work, what the 
rules governing the legal process are, what the customary rules are and the current problems 
facing the system. A customary judge is someone well-known and respected in the community. 
He has to be well acquainted with Islamic jurisprudence or Shari‟a Law, Qur‟an and Sunna, as 
well as old customs defining proper behavior. Sheikh Oudah stressed the element of “good sense 
of judgment” to distinguish “right” and “wrong.” He has to be committed to “seeking justice to 
please God rather than individual benefit.” He has to be capable of building an outstanding 
argument and convincing other judges and the community with it, as hundreds and sometimes 
thousands of people from within the local community attend the session and listen to the 
verdict‟s recitals. Sheikh Oudah believes that the public has the right to know why a certain 
verdict is best for all parties. People‟s knowledge of the reasons leading to the verdict would 
guarantee the different parties‟ commitment to the enforcement of that verdict in which case, it is 
the entire community that upholds the responsibility of enforcement leaving no chance for 
defection. The judge also has to be keen on restoring peace in the community and preventing 
further damage without acting as a lawyer to any of the parties. In the Delta usually judges do 
not take money. It is considered part of the “Thawab” or Godly reward. However, it gives the 
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person well known for being a judge prestige and is a reflection of a high social status. It means 
that that person is influential and enjoys a high degree of popularity.  
 When a conflict arises, customary judges are called upon to intervene. Sometimes it is the 
adversary families who ask certain judges to interfere; sometimes, other community members do, 
and sometimes it is the security institution that does. The two adversary families could choose 
the judges evenly but the one judge who constitutes the swing vote among them cannot be 
chosen by either. He is mostly the person who owns the place where the tribunal is held called 
“Raa’ey Al Bait” or   تيبلا يعار .   
 To hold the customary tribunal session, there are rules that have to be applied. First, all 
conflicting parties have to agree to the holding of the session in a gesture that they indeed want a 
resolution of the conflict and peace restoration. If they refuse, holding the session is pointless, 
and it means that one of the parties will use force. Second, there have to be guarantees that both 
parties will abide by the verdict reached whatever it is. There are two types of guarantees, 
financial and social. Financially, both parties have to sign checks with an equal amount of money 
to that both have to pay before the session. In case there is a breach, the money goes to the other 
party. Socially, each party has to have a distinguished figure guaranteeing the enforcement of the 
verdict from his own family called “Kabara” or (ةرابك) or could ask for another distinguished and 
powerful figure from a different family to be his/her Kabara. Minutes are taken with such rules, 
and it is called the minutes of the customary tribunal session or   يفرع نيكحت رضحه . 
 The entire customary session (تيفرعلا تسلجلا) takes no more than one day. Sheikh Oudah 
says that it could take more than 10 hours, but it has to be over in one day. Judges call upon 
witnesses and parties to defend their case. They swear by the Qora‟an. Since judges deal with 
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different cases including injuries and murder, at least one of them has to be an expert in injuries, 
and he is called “Kassas Al Dam” (مدلا صاَصق), an expertise that judges inherit from their 
predecessors. They do not have any medical background, but they are experts with injuries to 
measure the intensity of each. If the injured is a woman, the judge also examines her condition 
along with one male member of her family that is considered a “Mahram” like brother or a 
father. The “court” also recognizes certificates from different hospitals and state documents, and 
they take the responsibility for guaranteeing the authenticity of such documents using their 
common sense and expertise.  
 Each injury has its own wergild
78
 depending on its severity. A full wergild or „deya’ in 
Islamic Shari‟a is given in cases of manslaughter, and the Ulama’ in Islamic Research Center 
(تيهلاسلإا ثوحبلا عوجه) affiliated to the Azhar 79 decided that a full wergild paid in cases of 
manslaughter is equal to 4.25 kilos of gold. 
80
 Therefore, if the injury resulted into the loss of the 
victim‟s hand, half that amount is paid. If both hands, the full wergild is paid. In addition, every 
stitch is calculated and is worth, according to Sheikh Oudah from 500-1000 Egyptian Pounds.  
 Sheikh Oudah believes that customary tribunals face an important challenge these days: 
legalization. He believes that there has to be some state control over those judges, as some of 
them are not properly qualified to become judges. He believes that there is an increasing number 
of wealthy people and parliamentary members who become customary judges to gain some 
prestige and support certain families at the expense of others. He complained that some of them 
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act as lawyers, and other are not fully aware of Shari‟a principles which renders them unqualified 
for such a mission.  
The police plays significant role in these sessions. Sheikh Oudah confirmed that almost 
80 percent of the cases he adjudicates in, it is the police that asks him to interfere, and 
representatives of the Ministry of Interior attend most of the sessions. The head of security in the 
governorate might attend or the head of the criminal investigation department, especially if there 
is murder case involved. Otherwise, they have to be notified beforehand that there is going to be 
a customary tribunal. They are responsible for securing the sessions and guaranteeing that all 
attendees are unarmed. In highly dangerous sessions, the security institution might even bring 
electronic detectors to inspect all attendees. In case any of the parties defect or refuse the verdict, 
customary rules might not be sufficient. The police institution uses its lawful right to detain any 
citizen, according to the emergency law enacted in Egypt from 1981-2011 opening the room for 
use of violence and police brutality.  
In the Sinai Peninsula 
Customary law and customary tribunals are very visible in regions with a Bedouin 
heritage especially Upper Egypt and Sinai. Each has its own characteristics. A tribe is a social 
group that is based on kinship or descent; a group of people share the same origin, land, religion, 
language and territory.
81
 
 The tribal system is a system of social organization where the tribe is a distinct social, 
political and economic unit enter into relations with different tribes. These tribes enter into 
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various economic and social inter-relations that requires some form of organization. The 
implications of this system on the legal system are many. First, since the tribe is the main social 
unit rather than the individual, social peace is associated with peace among the tribes. The legal 
framework governing their behavior is in essence a law governing inter-tribal relations. Due to 
constant interaction among different tribes, customs have risen after prolonged periods of 
negotiations to achieve social control and therefore peaceful co-existence. In addition, law is also 
a means to maintaining the social solidarity existing inside the tribe, and therefore maintaining 
the same power structure. Second, the tribal system is very powerful in Sinai. It is even more 
powerful than the formal legal system. It is harder for an individual to escape social punishment, 
as the entire society becomes an agent of enforcement unlike the formal law enforcement system 
where certain limited number of individuals, law enforcement agents, is responsible for fulfilling 
that function.  
 The state sometimes, officially, recognizes the authority of some of these tribunals. For 
example, the Governorate of Northern Sinai has recognized and officially appointed 32 
customary judges to settle any dispute that may arise in the region. Resolutions of this court are 
binding, and parties register the solution in the Notary Office and the office of public prosecutor. 
If any of the parties object to the solution, he/she can resort to official state legal system. 
82
 
 Each tribe chooses its own leader, but there are not specific criteria based on which the 
leader is chosen. Each tribe has its own gathering place where all the men belonging to the tribe 
with its different branches meet called „Maja’d,‟ „Diwan’ or „Shag.‟ Leadership of the tribe 
could be inherited or it could go the closest person to the old leader. 
83
 All members of tribes can 
                                                          
82
 Ghuneim, 69.  
83
 Ibid, 69.  
61 
 
maintain communication only through the Sheikh. For example, if a member to the tribe has to 
go to the obligatory military service or to have a national ID or a passport issued, he has to have 
a letter signed by the Sheikh.  
Customary law is not codified nor collected; it lies in people‟s memories. The laws cover 
a wide range of human activity from land problems, family affairs, commercial issues and all 
sorts of problems. Some argue the rules are primarily derived from Islamic Shari‟a, but the rules 
are mostly customary. They derive from Shari‟a law, but the laws cover issues that Shari‟a does 
not tackle. By nature, customary law is an output of experiences from real cases for long periods 
of time.  For example, punishments for injuries vary depending on the type and intensity of 
injury. Every stitch has a “price.” And the more serious the injury is, the higher the cost. In 
addition, there are well-known legal procedures that all parties must follow. For example, in case 
of a fight between two families, the family of the offender must go to the attacked family to 
make sure the family of the victim does not retaliate until a customary hearing is in place or 
reconciliation is reached. Governorates in the Peninsula choose 32 customary judges to form 
what is known as the “Customary Judicial Council” who are entrusted to the knowledge of such 
memories and wisdom. 
The authority of Sheikhs over individuals in the tribe is being reduced with increased 
educational levels. Members of tribes are engineers, teachers, and doctors. Educated members of 
the tribes seek independence from the authority of the Sheikh. In the past few decades, the 
Sheikh‟s word in different issues is more negotiable, and more recently, members of the tribe 
demand official registration of the reconciliation gatherings in the office of public persecutor and 
court. In other words, verbal agreements no longer have the power they used to have.  
62 
 
Parliamentary elections are a manifestation of power structure in the peninsula. In 
northern Sinai, there are 13 tribes with different sheikhs and 43 different families. The 43 family 
heads gather to decide who will run in the coming parliamentary elections so that no future 
grievances arise when a certain family member becomes their representative in the parliament. 
Interestingly enough, they gather in the National Democratic Party‟s headquarters in the 
governorate. Local councils‟ appointments are also decided upon in these meetings.84 Parties to 
the conflict are free to willingly choose among those judges, and they can handle all kinds of 
problems ranging from murder, manslaughter, commercial affairs, land problems and family 
affairs.  
Tribes in Eastern Egypt 
There are many tribes in Egypt‟s Eastern desert the biggest of which is „Al Ababda‟ and 
„Al Beshareya,‟ and both also follow a rigid customary legal system. They derive their laws from 
both Islamic Shari‟a as well as long established set of customs. Custom here takes a name that is 
different from that in all other regions in Egypt. It is called „Selef’ or   فليس ; and the customary 
tribunal is called „Majlis Al Selef.‟ All problems are solved through customary tribunals: 
commercial, criminals or family affairs. They also enter into alliances after negotiations to share 
natural resources existing in the environment. Among such rules is that in case of murder, the 
victim‟s family would wait for the other tribe to demand reconciliation for a period that does not 
exceed a week. They also have a rule that is binding that allows person who feels a certain action 
of another individual that has negative consequences on him to voice his discontent, and the 
other party would automatically try to make a restitution. This system is called ‘Yay Hamad’ or 
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 داوه ىاي . In injuries, there are different evaluation methods to measure the damage and decide 
upon the punishment accordingly. There are different rules governing murder. The killer is either 
executed in return or he could pay the wergild or „deya’ that reaches 40 camels. If the killer 
belongs to the same tribe of the victim, he would be required to give, in addition to the normal 
wergild, one of the women closely linked to him to the victim‟s family where she would marry 
one of the family members until she has her first baby and then she is free to chose to either stay 
or leave to her family. Recently, women began to voice their discontent to that rule, and that is 
why the murdered would pay double the wergild instead. 
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Conclusion 
Customs are not necessarily associated with a traditional society. It is true that the formal 
state legal system evolved from being customary laws in Ancient times; however, customs still 
plays a significant role in the modern legal systems all over the world. Some legal systems are 
based, to a large extent, on customary norms, and others, such as Egypt, has custom as a major 
source of law. Custom and law are not in conflict, and in some cases, they are not in absolute 
harmony. The Egyptian legal system has four sources of law put forward in a hierarchy of power, 
laws promulgated by the parliament, custom, Islamic Jurisprudence and principles of justice and 
natural law. The conflict erupts when a long-established customary rule conflicts with the state 
rules and laws such as the criminal code. Egypt is one of the countries with a strong legal and 
constitutional heritage. However, when people resort to informality, it might indicate problems 
with the legal system, either its judicial or executive branch. The judicial system in Egypt does 
suffer problems that the political regime showed little interest in reforming, which might results 
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into the very slow legal process and maybe compromising their independence and integrity. 
Judges are limited in number; their financial standard is not up to the current rates of inflation, 
and control for the executive branch of government. As a result, it can be argued that resorting to 
customary forms of conflict resolution is becoming a phenomenon. Contrary to common 
stereotypes, customary tribunals are not limited to Upper Egypt, which is already a large segment 
of population in Egypt, it is spreading in other parts of Egypt such as Sinai and the even the 
densely populated Delta Region. Such spread is a sign that the general trend is leaning towards 
customary forms of conflict resolution rather than state-mediated system.  
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CHAPTER III 
THA‟R IN UPPER EGYPT DESCRIBED 
Literature on tha’r is limited to some scattered opinion articles in newspapers and 
some scholarly articles. Almost all of them address the issue as a pure sociological 
phenomenon and blame tradition for the spread of tha’r in Upper Egypt. This chapter 
provides a descriptive analysis of the Tha’r or blood vengeance in Upper Egypt as well as 
a review of the literature handling the phenomenon. It tackles the origins of the 
phenomenon and attempts to challenge the common misconceptions related to the over-
exaggerated role played by illiteracy and poverty as causes of the „tha’r „phenomenon. In 
other words, it is not only a sociological phenomenon where the culture and inherited 
misconceptions are the sole or even the main factors exacerbating the problem.  The set 
of data provided by the Ministry of Interior is problematic to rely on and far from being 
able to help draw any reliable conclusions about „tha’r’ in Egypt. In addition, the 
sociological literature on the phenomenon does not provide theories to explain the 
phenomenon but rather describe it only.  
Origins 
‘Tha’r‟ or blood vengeance is an ancient tradition that was most prevalent among 
Arab tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. It derives its power from family or tribal solidarity 
where the individual does not enjoy independence from the group-defined rights and 
duties. Tribes consider the killing of one of its members an assault on the entire group, 
and the higher the status of the family member killed, the bigger the magnitude of the 
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assault and the greater the retaliation or vendetta should be. The “value” the victim 
determines the intensity of the damage done to the family. For example, if the murdered 
is one of the family‟s leaders, one of the family‟s educated members such as an engineer, 
physician, university professor, an army or police officer, retaliation has to target 
someone as valuable as the person killed or a large number of people to compensate for 
one “valuable” member. Responsibility for vendetta is a group obligation where the 
entire family bears the responsibility. Vengeance is both an entitlement to the family of 
the deceased and a duty, an entitlement to the family to restore its “dignity” and a duty 
that has to be fulfilled to fend off feeling of “disgrace.”  
Vendetta and Manslaughter 
As long as considerations of “dignity” are justifications for murder, the different 
between deliberate murder and manslaughter becomes irrelevant to the family of the 
deceased. While tha’r inherited rules stipulates that vengeance is allowed only in cases of 
deliberate murder, in reality, this is not the case. “Many tribes and families do not 
differentiate between manslaughter and deliberate murder.”86 Family competition 
manifests itself in blood vengeance cases, and therefore, manslaughter may result in 
serious bloody spirals. Many reported vengeance cases that have a long history might be 
due to a fight between two members of families over a small piece of land or a fight 
between children that was aggravated to include elder members. Once blood is spilt, 
permanent animosity or at least competition between families is created. Competition 
may take a positive form whereby families compete in educating their members and take 
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pride in its members who hold socially-respected positions or become wealthy. However, 
mutual hatred continues. The family of the deceased usually feels victimized and 
humiliated, feelings that are “the main cause of all problems” as Sheikh Mohamed 
Oudah, the „Urfi’ Judge, said.  The aim behind vendetta is always “punishment and 
bringing the sociopolitical balance of power between families back.” 
 Vendetta and Islamic Jurisprudence 
Despite what some Upper Egyptians who believe in the „tha’r’ mechanism claim 
that „tha’r’ rules are driven from Islamic tradition, the rules Islamic Shari’a do not 
conform to the rules of „tha’r.‟ While Islamic jurisprudence approves of the “an-eye-for-
an-eye,” principles of bringing about justice called „kasas,‟ vengeance in Upper Egypt 
does not comply with the conditions necessary for „kasas.‟ Islam recognizes the element 
of punishment, but in it can only happen to the murderer not any member of the family 
according to the family‟s criteria of the “value” of the deceased. Only the murdered and 
those who conspired should be punished.
87
 In addition, tribal rules stipulate that if the 
murder happens within the family, the punishment may range from expelling the 
murderer forever and preventing him from marrying a girl from the family. All his money 
and property could be confiscated. Furthermore, a father has the right to punish his son or 
daughter as he wishes even if it results in murder. Consequently, the way in which many 
Upper Egyptians perceive „kasas’ is quite different from the way it is perceived in 
Islamic Shari‟a.   
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Tha‟r has Rules 
‘Tha’r’ has its own rigid rules. One of these rules is that if an authority figure 
from a different family promises to protect the murderer, the family of the deceased 
would be required to enter a conflict with that figure as well. Second, females in the 
family of the deceased are not allowed to dress colorful clothes until vengeance is taken. 
They are allowed to cook dark-looking food only, and marriages take place without a big 
ceremony. In addition, a female can refuse to sleep with her husband who refuses to take 
the vengeance. Women and children must not be killed, and if it happens that they are 
killed, it is considered a sign of cowardice punishable by more killings on the other side. 
Vengeance must of taken from men; however, if women and children fall victims, in 
reality, the blood spiral may not discriminate between sexes and ages. Damage of 
property and cattle is also considered a sign of cowardice and meanness. It shows the 
murderer is not capable of facing the challenge and getting their vengeance “like men.” 
„Tha’r’ cannot be taken in certain occasions such as harvest time, during excessive 
rainfall and locust attacks to lessen the impact of the fight on people‟s livelihood since 
the whole village becomes a dangerous territory for people. Women and children need to 
walk around safely and to fend off the common damage of excessive rainfalls and locust. 
Houses are forbidden territory. No vengeance or blood is to be spilt there. Finally, it is 
well known that vengeance cannot be taken in the presence of children so as not to put 
them in danger, and they should not see a murder at such an early age. 
Compliance to such inherited rules is being shaken as time passes due to reduced 
tribal bondages. Recently, there is a great deal of disobedience of such rules. For 
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example, “Beit Allam Massacre”88 where around 22 were killed, was mass murder where 
women and children were killed as well as unarmed men. Although there is no official 
estimate of the actual rate of defiance to family and tribal rules, there is noticeable change 
in the degree of compliance to old rules. Beit Allam’s massacre is a very blunt example, 
but there are cases of disobedience to tribal rules.  
The Geographical Distribution of Tha‟r 
Tha’r’ is a phenomenon that is widespread all over Egypt; however, it is more 
prevalent and institutionalized in Upper Egypt and areas with strong tribal institutions. 
(See table 1-A) It is concentrated especially in the governorates of Assyut and Sohag 
where 58.7 percent of „tha’r’ cases are officially reported in 2001. The tables below show 
the concentration in Upper Egyptian governorates as well as areas where there is a strong 
tribal concentration in Sinai Peninsula. Table 1-B shows that tha’r is a consistent 
phenomenon over the years (1997-2001) 
Percentage of tha’r compared to other crimes in the year 2001 
Governorate Percentage of tha’r to other crimes 
Giza 3.5 % 
Alexandria 4.5 % 
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Beheira 6.3 % 
Northern Sinai 16.7 
Southern Sinai 100 % (only one case 
Beni Swief (Upper 
Egypt) 
13.2% 
Fayum (Upper Egypt) 23.1% 
Menya (Upper Egypt) 11.4% 
Assyut (Upper Egypt) 23 % 
Qena (Upper Egypt)  4.8 % 
The Red Sea 
Governorate 
 20 % 
Total  12 % of total crimes in Egypt 
Source: Statistics Department, Criminal Investigation Unit, General Security Division 
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Percentage of Tha‟r Cases to Total Murder Cases by Governorate 
Governorate 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Assyut 
20.6% 
(45 Cases) 
20.9% 
(43 Cases) 
17% 
(41 Cases) 
 
20.7% 
(47 Cases) 
 
 
23% 
(44 Cases) 
 
Sohag 
24.2% 
(15 Cases) 
19.1% 
(8 Cases) 
23.1% 
(6 Cases) 
18.5% 
10 (Cases) 
35.7% 
10 ( Cases) 
Minya 
21.6% 
8 (Cases) 
 
20.6% 
7 (Cases) 
 
24.1% 
7 (Cases) 
 
22.2% 
4 (Cases) 
 
11.4% 
4 (Cases) 
 
Beni Sweif 
3% 
1(Case) 
 
25% 
5 (Cases) 
 
10.3% 
3 (Cases) 
 
6.9 % 
2 (Cases) 
 
13.2% 
2 (Cases) 
 
Source: Statistics Department, Criminal Investigation Unit, General Security Division 
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Magnitude of Tha‟r 
Tha‟r constitutes around 11-12 percent of murder crimes in Egypt. The available data 
(from the period 1997-2001) show a clear consistency over the years. Tha‟r incidents are 
not sporadic events. They are consistent over the years and became part of people‟s lives. 
In an interview in Nazza Karar in the governorate of Assyut, interviewees said that the 
voice of gun shooting is normal every once in a while. In fact, a couple of days before the 
interview, interviewees said that there were gun shooting between two families but have 
not resulted into serious injuries.  
Year 
Percentage of Tha‟r 
to Crimes 
Number of Cases 
Total Number of 
Murder Cases 
1997 11% 85 717 
1998 12.7% 91 714 
1999 10.5% 69 659 
2000 12.4% 80 646 
2001 12.4% 72 601 
Source: Kandil, Alaa‟ El Din, Ghaleb Abdel Gawad, Amr Hany and Amr Zaki, “Hagm wa Mustakbal 
Thaherat Al Tha‟r fi Misr: Derasa Ihsa‟eya Tahlileya,” (Police Training Institute: Police Academy, 2002), 
180. 
Causes of Tha‟r 
Sociological research, media propaganda and research issued by police academy research 
centers all attribute spread of „tha’r’ to tradition, low educational levels and poverty. 
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While police statistics provide some evidence to support such an argument, relying on 
this set of data is misleading. In the coming section includes a thorough analysis of each 
factor using the data of the Ministry of Interior as well as a critique of the conclusions 
drawn based on this set of data.  
Vengeance and Education 
Despite problems with the data available on vengeance and education, it reveals 
that actual perpetrators of the crime are mostly among the less-educated but still a 
number of educated individuals may commit a vengeance crime.(See table below)   
 The Educational Attainment of tha’r Perpetrators 
Year 
Number 
of 
Accused 
Illiterates Literates 
Basic 
Education 
Preparatory 
Education 
Secondary 
Education 
University 
Education 
Unknown 
1997 231 78% 9% - 2% 8% 3% - 
1998 231 77% 11% - 1% 6% 5% - 
1999 189 72% 16% - 3% 5% 2% 2% 
2000 221 72% 11% .05% - 8% 9% - 
2001 178 74% 17% - 1% 6% 2% - 
Source: General Security Department- Criminal Monitoring Division- Statistics Section 
91  
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Tha‟r and Occupation 
Although statistics show that almost half of perpetrators are peasants (see table 3), 
it is not an indicator of poverty or low socioeconomic status. Official data recognize only 
occupations as written in National Identification Cards. A “peasant” does not necessarily 
refer to a poor individual: a peasant may own massive areas of land and still be labeled a 
“peasant.” The Egyptian parliamentary law and 1971 constitution stipulate that 50 
percent of members of parliament have to be workers and peasants. Such a rule 
encouraged many rich land owners to acquire the liable of a “peasant” in their National 
Identification Cards to gain access to the parliament.  
Occupations of Perpetrators 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Peasant 65% 68% 52% 62% 46% 
Merchant 5% 2% .4% 2% 0% 
Government 
Employee 
2% 2% 3% 4% .4 
Police 
Officers 
1% .4% 1% .4% 0% 
Low-ranking 
Soldiers 
.4% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
Individuals 
Working 
Education 
0% 1% 2% 3% 1% 
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Medicine 
and nursery 
.4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Fishermen .4% .4% 0% 0% 0% 
Drivers 2% 3% 5% 3% 3% 
Security 
Personnel 
.4% 1% 0% .4% 0% 
Artisans 10% 10% 6% 10% 8% 
Unemployed 
males 
3% 4% 7% 8% 11% 
Unemployed 
Females 
1% .4% 0% .4% .4% 
Student 1% 2% 3% 1% 3% 
Armed 
Forces 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 3% 3% 1% 0% 1% 
Source: General Security Department- Criminal Monitoring Division- Statistics Section 
92 
Problems with Data 
There are three major problems that should make readers question the ability of 
the available data to provide an accurate account of the phenomenon, although the data 
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may provide some insight and helpful information about the phenomenon. Availability of 
information is problem in research. Data on Tha‟r is limited to that provided by a special 
body within the Ministry of Interior called „The General Security.‟ Gathering such data 
and disseminating it, if there is a political will to do so, is among its missions. In a 
discussion with one of the officials running the police academy research center, he said 
that even the General Security would not provide researchers or journalists with 
information and statistics on crimes. They take the initiative to disseminate such 
information when they want to. 
The second problem with such set of data is that the cases reported are the ones 
where the court has recognized a vengeance case and official justice was sought in the 
court room. However, cases that are nullified due to the reconciliation are not reported as 
„tha’r’ where both parties decide to tamper with evidence and testimonies to nullify the 
case, as the law does not recognize reconciliation in murder. All testimonies of 
interviewees admit that people deliberately tamper with evidence and give false and 
contradictory testimonies to nullify the either when a reconciliation is reached or in case 
they want to go on with vendetta.  
The third problem has to do with punishing real perpetrators and those planning 
and pushing for the crime. Family leaders and the educated individuals who are 
considered “valuable elements” in the family may not be “jeopardized” by having them 
take vengeance with their own hands even though it is the ultimate honor. However, they 
might be part of the conspiracy through instigation, funding or hiring professional 
assassins.  
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Forth, in conflicts where both Muslims and Christians are parties, the police do its 
best to reach reconciliation for because conflicts of that sort take a sectarian dimension, 
and the regime for prolonged periods has always been keen on hiding the truth about 
existing cases of sectarian strife. The real details of the case should be not officially 
reported. Therefore, it is unclear whether such cases are included into the records or not.   
Literature on Tha’r does not Provide an Explanation  
Tha’r is perceived in the sociological literature as a phenomenon that is associated 
with a sub-culture that is different from the “general culture” predominant in society.93 
Egyptian society includes a number of sub-cultures, in Sinai, Upper Egypt and Nubian 
culture that is predominant at the Egypt‟s southern borders with Sudan. This theoretical 
perspective assumes that Egypt has a dominant culture and few sub-cultures. Some 
cultural elements such as tha’r are “deviant” from the dominant culture. Therefore, it is 
legally prohibited. A study conducted by the Center for Social Research Study in Sohag, 
argued that such “deviant” sub-culture is associated with some other phenomena: the 
peasant community and agriculture-related professions, belonging to an extended family, 
settling in the same village for decades without exposure to other cultures, economic 
hardships and poverty, traditional view of women as subordinates, harsh masculine 
upbringing of males in society, low educational level. 
94
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Literature on tha’r does not tackle state performance in dealing with the issue. 
Another sociological study 
95
 rejects to link tha’r to state capacity to penetrate society. 
The reason behind this denial is that tha’r has started to take more violent forms. “We 
would like to assure that a sociological explanation is needed. There are explanations –of 
tha’r- but they are not enough to explain the increase in tha’r incidents and the different 
forms it is taking in a modern society,” Dr. Zayed, the former dean of Faculty of Arts in 
Cairo University and the famous sociology professor, wrote in the research paper. Dr. 
Zayed goes on to describe the intensity of violence in the current tha’r incidents 
describing them as more of “gangs‟ attacks” or “terrorist attacks.” The paper delves into 
the details related to the well-known rules of tha’r without any explanation. In fact, the 
author describes the questions demanding an explanation of tha’r, the different forms it is 
taking and the variable affecting it are all “confusing.”96 Dr. Zayed is the only professor 
who tackled the question of the relationship between state capacity to penetrate society 
and tha’r but negated the relationship between state performance and the phenomenon.  
Conclusion 
Blaming Tha’r on poverty, illiteracy and tradition is a misleading conclusion. 
Th’r is indeed a cultural tradition, and most perpetrators are illiterates; however, this is 
far from being enough to prove that links tha’r to illiteracy. Educated family members 
still commit tha’r, but they may not take it with their own hands so as not “sacrifice” the 
educated members they take pride in. Professional assassins are hired for that purpose. In 
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addition, limiting the scope of research to focusing on the social drives for tha’r means 
ignoring one of the most important actors involved in the phenomenon, the state. 
Ignoring the interaction of the main state institution that assumes the function of 
maintaining order in society, the police force, leads defiantly to deformed results.  
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CHAPTER IV 
POLICE AND THA‟R 
The police is an “organized civil force” responsible for the maintenance of public peace, 
safety and order.”97 It is a function necessary for civilized coexistence among citizens. Even 
though it is an indispensable public good, law enforcement officers are never popular to the 
constituency they are serving because they are vested with “wide ramifications” that affect 
people‟s freedoms.  Law enforcement agents are endowed with the power to use violence in the 
form of “collecting and communicating intelligence affecting public peace,” preventing offences 
to the public peace, arresting and detecting offenders and eventually bringing them to justice. It 
keeps order in public places and prevents dangers and damages to the citizenry. Any abuse of 
these powers has serious effects on people‟s freedom as well as their sense of security and justice 
in society, a problem that is aggravated if there is an authoritarian regime in power. However, 
due to the justified public cynicism towards any security institution that is due to the long record 
of human rights abuses, democratic states tend to impose restrictions on the functioning of the 
police to protect the citizenry and prevent this huge institution with immense powers from 
bullying society. 
Taking vengeance outside of the state system by killing the murder or one of his/her 
relatives or family system is a clear and blunt violation of the law. It is considered deliberate first 
degree murder punishable by death according to article 230 of the Egyptian Criminal Code.  The 
data provided by the Ministry of Interior suggests a very high rate of case-solving and arrests of 
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murders. However, the problem with such data, as detailed in the previous chapter, is that it is 
limited to those cases where there were arrests and court decisions only. In reality, an 
unidentified number of cases are deemed null due to reconciliation or customary tribunals. In 
fact, most customary “judges” interviewed say that the police demand their intervention in 
“most” of the crimes that take place in villages.98 With this in mind, one can only be highly 
skeptical of the data provided below by the Ministry.  
As for those actually arrested and convicted, it is hardly possible to suggest it is due to 
hard and sophisticated police work. Because taking vengeance is a source of pride, it is easy to 
pinpoint the perpetrator who takes pride in committing the “murder.”99 Furthermore, police 
officers closely monitor the map of family adversaries to be able to predict future troubles given 
the history of animosities and competition in each village. Such monitoring gives a room for 
police officers to sponsor reconciliations in hotspots for conflicts. 
Interviews reveal police brutality and threat of using violence against the families of 
criminals is what blackmails them into turning themselves voluntarily to save their wives, 
mothers, children and other family members from torture and arbitrary detention.  
Not only is tha’r dangerous to people‟s lives, it is associated with other crimes that are 
widespread in Upper Egypt. Therefore, it is imperative to understand how the police force deals 
with the phenomenon. The police force suffers internal institutional problems that affect its 
ability to perform its basic function of upholding rule of law and achieving security.  These 
problems are low salaries, lack of sophisticated investigative tools and techniques, poor 
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supervision, non-existent coaching, harsh working conditions and lack of awareness of human 
rights  
Percentage of Police Arrests of the Accused 
Year Total Number 
of cases 
Number of cases 
where all were 
caught 
Number of cases 
where some 
were arrested 
Murderers are 
known but still 
at large
100
  
1997 85 75 3 3 
1998 91 88 1 2 
1999 69 57 8 4 
2000 80 71 3 6 
2001 72 62 2 8 
Source: Statistics Department, Criminal Investigation Unit, General Security Division 
101 
Other Crimes Associated with Tha’r 
Tha‟r results into the spread of other crimes such fraud, perjury, the emergence of 
professional assassin‟s, bribes and mediators who profit off fights.  Both taking vengeance and 
the informal reconciliation necessitate the disruption of the legal process. If the family of the 
deceased is determined to take vengeance, formal documents that could build a case again the 
murderer are irrelevant. Therefore, they give false testimonies that the deceased had no enemies 
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and refuse to accuse anyone. If they reach reconciliation with the other family, there is a need to 
drop the criminal charge. And since that is not legally possible in crimes, the only way is to deem 
the case null by forgery and false testimonies. Most dangerously, a stratum of professional killers 
who get paid generously has emerged, and therefore nurturing and providing a lucrative market 
for the most dangerous criminals.
102
 Other crimes also emerge such as bribes and the interference 
of power-seeking abusive figures who profit off bloody conflicts called “blood merchants” or 
„tuggar al dam’ who make it a job to aggravate animosity between parties to facilitate arms trade 
and take commissions from all parties. Police officers note that there are a number of people who 
voluntarily intervene for reconciliation, but in fact, they profit off the situation. Some intervene 
only to gain political grounds in elections by allying with certain families and acting as lawyers 
rather than arbitrators.
103
 Interestingly, those people may be called upon to become „urfi’ who is 
supposed to reach reconciliation and restore peace.” However, the most important and dangerous 
business emerging out of „tha’r’ is arms trade.  
The Weapons Question 
The question of weapons in „tha’r’ is a critical one. Possession of weapons is an integral 
part of Upper Egyptian life. Almost every Egyptian citizen in Upper Egypt has weapons. Poverty 
is not an obstacle to owning weapons.  In an interview with a retired Brigadier General and a 
senior figure in „Nazza Karar’ village in „Manfalout,‟ Mohamed Reda, he said that weapons 
especially machine guns are so common that some people sell some of their land to buy them. 
Sheikh Saad, one of the sheikhs and prominent figures of Al „Mandara‟ who assumes the rule of 
a customary arbitrator, mentioned a story of a young, new officer who went to „Al Mandara’ 
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recently after he joined the police force saw a number of citizens holding weapons in a microbus. 
The officer stopped the bus and asked for their gun-possession licenses. People refused his 
request, and a conflict erupted between the small police force and those in the bus resulting in a 
few injuries. Sheikh Saad said that senior officers interfered to ease the tension and “explain the 
situation on the ground” to the “inexperienced” officer who did not realize that weapons are an 
integral part of life. In fact, all interviewees admit they have “legal” weapons in their position, 
but they never use them unless they are travelling at night where they could be of danger of gang 
attacks.   
Weapons exist without an accurate estimate of the amount of legal and illegal weapons. 
There is no official estimate or at least an official public statement indicating how much of the 
weapons used in Upper Egypt is smuggled from abroad. However, literature in Police Academy 
Research Center and other newspapers indicate that police and army storage houses are primary 
sources of weapons.
104
 Storekeepers may resort to filing phony reports that storage houses were 
robbed, and weapons and live ammunition confiscated are stolen. However, when an inventory is 
run, some cases are revealed.
105
  
Arms trade, especially machine guns, is a lucrative business in Upper Egypt. 
Sophisticated arms make it easy to shoot accurately the “target.” It is also a method of telling 
everybody in the village that the vengeance is taken and duty fulfilled.
106
 Possession of 
unauthorized weapons is illegal and punishable by law; however the law does not authorize 
possession of machine guns. Possession of one machine gun is punishable by a 25 year sentence 
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in prison. The geographic features of the area help the arms trade flourish. Cities and villages 
around the river Nile are surrounded with steep cliffs rising on either side with deserts. In the 
valley, the land is fertile but the area around is desert land. The complex geographic structure of 
the mountain makes it easy for arms dealers to smuggle weapons.  In addition, weapons are 
usually buried in remote and abandoned areas to be out of sight. This is the main reason why 
police campaigns searching for machine guns in households usually fail to capture them.
107
 
Sudden or surprise campaigns to capture illicit weapons do not work because people bury such 
illegal weapons in distant remote areas deep in earth, and when parties to a certain conflict are 
called to the police station to deliver their weapons, they buy other cheaper and low quality  ones 
to turn in to the police.
108
 
Tha‟r in Police Literature 
Police Academy literature tends to classify „tha’r’ as a sociological phenomenon. 
Research written by police officers is helpful in identifying how police officers view Upper 
Egyptian society as well as the phenomenon itself, how the security institution should handle the 
crises and the role of other societal stakeholders. Research in the Police Academy Research 
Center attributes the spread of „th’ar’ to the social system and inherited traditions. Some go as 
far as arguing that that harsh punishment are useless since taking „tha’r’ is a matter of dignity, as 
perpetrators realize that they would be executed for such a crime, but still they prefer the social 
pride.
109
 The ready-made old remedy lies in expanding education and religious awareness. For 
education to be an effective tool to combat „tha’r,‟ it “should consolidate the feeling of 
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individuality and independence from the group.
110
 Furthermore, more effort should be exerted to 
raise religious awareness of the rules of „kassas’ as opposed to „tha’r’ using different possible 
means.  
One of the research studies handling the question of „tha’r’ as well as most interviews 
focus particularly on the role of women in encouraging men to take vengeance where men who 
want to prove “manhood” have to look masculine in the eyes of women. General Reda of Nazza 
Karar complained that the role of women saying that they may even refuse to have sex with their 
husbands as long as they have not taken „tha’r’ and refuse to cook for them. “She keeps nagging 
and crying,” said General Reda showing how wives, mothers and sisters they use emotional 
pressure on men of the family.  
Police Literature Recommendations to Handle Tha‟r Problem 
The ready-made fixed set of recommendations in police literature is two dimensional, a 
role given to the police institution and another to the state and society in general. There are 
certain recommendations on how to handle the „tha’r’ question that most literature on the subject 
shares. In fact, there was a great deal of repetition from one piece of research to the other.  
 Police Academy literature on Tha‟r is characterized by three features, lack of well-
thought out and studied discussion of each and every recommendation to handle „tha’r’ problem, 
no innovation and repeating the same ideas presented in older piece of research and conventional 
wisdom and giving the Ministry a socio-political role in addition to their ordinary security 
function. The literature draws a “security strategy” for Upper Egypt that is made of a number of 
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recommendations to properly use the Ministry‟s resources to handle „tha’r’ problem. These 
recommendations are:  
1- Using emergency law instead of the complex and slow legal procedures. 
2- Sponsoring the security reconciliation attempts known as “Al Musalahat Al Amneya” to 
avoid future conflicts and supporting “Customary tribunals” where major family heads 
and customary “judges” interfere to reach reconciliation. The ministry actually put 
forward rules to handle such tribunals that would be elaborated upon in detail below. In 
fact, such a step could turn the police into a party playing a political role and strip it of 
the impartiality it should have in order to be able to perform its job of law enforcement. 
The chapter than handles customary tribunals provides more insight on the issue. 
3- Building “good relations” with influential figures inside villages and governorates and 
“raising their status within the limits of law to facilitate efforts of the police.”111 
However, such “good relations” and the boundaries for cooperation are not defined, 
which raises questions regarding the integrity of the police force in dealing with different 
social actors and citizens. It implies that some citizens are more important than others. 
4- Drawing maps of animosity and identifying the most vulnerable areas and families most 
likely to engage in a fight.  
5- Constant inspection campaigns searching for weapons targeting those most likely to take 
vengeance. 
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6- Reducing the number of weapons licenses given by the Ministry of Interior  
7- Pinpointing individuals who ignite the fights and encourage violence.  
8- Improving the number of informants inside villages and among families to be able to 
predict potential violent actions and attempting to prevent them 
9- Improving performance on the boarders and the desert areas surrounding villages to 
prevent arms smuggling  
10- Increasing police force inside villages to make state power visible to people. 
There are plenty of problems with these recommendations. First, while improving the skills 
of police officers to handle the „tha’r’ issue is mentioned frequently in different sources, it is 
mentioned without spelling out how that could happen and specifying areas that needs 
improvement in police officers. Second, some recommendations strip the police of its one unique 
characteristic that it should have to be able to perform its policing function, neutrality. A police 
force is one executive arm of the state and the agency assigned by the state to enforce rule of 
law. Therefore, impartiality and equal distance from all parties is necessary for it to maintain its 
credibility and respect. Suggestions such as building and sometimes “improving” relations with 
families turn the police institution into a party to a conflict.  
The most dangerous of all these recommendations is the question of expanding the use of 
emergency law that was used as umbrella to cover many violations, human rights violations as 
well as to tighten the political grip of the regime. Most importantly, it is used extensively, 
according to many human rights reports and interviewees, in detaining the relatives of a fugitive 
(especially women) to force him to turn himself in as interviewees said. 
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Police-Sponsored Reconciliations 
Police-sponsored reconciliations are administrative tools to reach peaceful resolutions for 
conflict rather than legal ones. The Minister of Interior – Al Nabawi Ismael at that time-issued a 
decree 579 for the year 1978 (579/1978) handling police reconciliation committees at different 
administrative levels, the first is at the village level in the countryside. The second is at the 
„Sheyakha112’ level (in the city). The third is at the district level (in the city) and finally at the 
governorate level. Each committee is headed and administrated by police officers of different 
ranks who supervise the reconciliation process in their areas under their jurisdiction. The 
structure is as follows:
113
 
Reconciliation Committees at Different Local Administrative Levels 
Administrative Level Composition of the Committee Status 
At the Level of Village  Head of the Police Station 
 Two citizens chosen by both 
adversaries parties 
 The preacher (the Omdah114) 
Head 
 
Members 
 
Member 
At the Sheyakha  Level (an 
area inside the city known for 
being under the supervision of 
 An officer from the Police 
Station Assigned by the Head 
Head 
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 Omdah is an administrative task in villages. He is a government representative in the village and at the same time 
he is one of the public figures who is respected and maybe feared in society. The Omdah system emerged in the 
Ottoman era and it underwent different changes in times till it became a public post. There are laws governing the 
work of Omdas. However, interestingly, police literature refers to the Omdah as a preacher ظعاولا even though he is 
not a preacher in the common perception of the term. It is unclear why the Ministry gives him that label.  
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a popular old figure called 
“sheikh”) 
of the Police Station 
 A member in the local council 
 The preacher (Omdah) 
 A social worker (  يئاصخا
يعاوتجا) 
 Two the citizens chosen by 
the adversaries 
 
 
Member 
 
Member 
Member 
 
Member 
At the District Level (Inside 
the city 
 Head of police station or head 
of the investigation unit 
 Member of the local council 
  Member of the local center  
 Preacher 
 Social worker 
 Two citizens chosen by the 
adversary parties 
Head 
 
Member 
 
Member 
 
Member 
 
 
At the Governorate Level  Head of security department 
in the governorate (يهلأا ريده) 
 Head of the security 
committee in the governorate 
تظفاحولا يف يهلأا تٌجل سيئر 
 Head of the police station  
 A social worker 
 Preacher 
 Two of the citizens chosen by 
adversaries  
Head 
Member 
 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Source: Cited in Youssef Hamdeen et al, (2004), Nash‟at wa Asbab Thaherat al Tha‟r: Training and Development 
Institute, Police Academy, p. 36 
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The ministerial decree stipulates that the Ministry should also be keen on “properly” 
selecting individuals involved in the reconciliation process making sure they are reputable and 
honest; however, there is no guarantee on the seriousness of all parties to abide by the agreement 
reached.
115
 
Number of Reconciliations to Total Tha‟r Cases 
Year Number of Tha‟r Incidents Number of 
Reconciliations 
Remaining Percentage of 
Reconciliations to 
total Cases 
1997 266 157 99 37.21 
1998 216 133 86 39.26 
1999 214 123 91 42.52 
2000 208 84 124 59.61 
2001 259 144 115 44.40 
Source: El Beily, Ezzel Din, Ahmed et al. (2002), “Gareemat Al Tha‟r,” Ph.D. dissertation, Mubarak‟s Academy, 
School of Training and Development, 111-7. 
 
There are plenty of problems with Police-Sponsored reconciliation attempts. First, the 
short period officers spend in Upper Egypt reduces their incentive to finish  the jobs at hand, 
properly ending the reconciliation, leaving the problem to a new officers who is not involved 
well enough in the conflict in terms of, history, circumstances, nature of the parties to the 
conflict and power structure in the place.
116
 Second, officers may lack experience in 
reconciliation. Lack of experience may be manifested in their inability to properly determine 
which parties are susceptible to more pressures than others. What matters most to some officers 
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is registering in the Ministry‟s documents that they contributed to a reconciliation for a fast 
praise.
117
 Third, police may not be able to properly choose members of the reconciliation 
committee, which may result into the infiltration of one member who could aggravate the 
problem. 
118
 In addition, there is a question of quantity versus quality; officers care a lot about 
the quantity of reconciliations rather than the quality and sustainability.
119
 Therefore, pressure 
might be exercised just to get done with the reconciliation and get the praise without actually 
considering any form of justice. The reality on the ground means that the powerful parties would 
get preferential terms in the reconciliation. The weaker parties on the other hand do not have the 
power to go on with the animosity. Change of circumstances does play a role in the final results. 
A party travelling abroad, parliament members getting out of office, the death of a powerful 
leader would necessitate one party giving up some of their rights. Change of such circumstances 
may affect the post-reconciliation period. Fifth, while forcing parties to agree to reconciliation or 
forcing them into implementing it, some “gross violations happen during inspection campaigns” 
the most dangerous of which are “unlimited assault” on people.120 Sixth, some parties may be 
interested in aggravating the problems by drawing a wedge among families by leaking news 
about the weapons they possess, their types and paces of hiding them. Seventh, some mediators 
between the police and the people on the one hand and between adversaries on the other may 
emerge trying to profit off the conflict. They are mostly arms traders who provide adversaries 
with malfunctioning weapons to deliver to the police instead of the real working machines guns. 
People do that to avoid the “horrors associated with them [inspection campaigns].” Eighth, 
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rushing into making the reconciliation is harmful, since it is not routine work. Such cases are 
sensitive, and a certain degree of wisdom has to be there while handling them.
121
 Ninth, 
sometimes police officers choose to refrain from attacking highly criminal spots where there are 
highly influential and armed and dangerous criminals famous of resisting authorities.
122
 Instead 
they run campaigns over areas adjacent to these highly criminal spots and collect illegal 
weapons.  Finally, officers‟ lack of interest in learning the social and political conditions 
surrounding them, which results into a sense of frustration that they are not interested in people‟s 
livelihoods.
123
 
  Institutional problems within the Ministry of Interior that Aggravate Tha‟r 
The Ministry of Interior suffers many institutional problems that affect its performance 
and resorts to political and sometimes brutal means to achieve high arrests rates and achieving 
“peace.” Officers suffer immense pressures, low salaries, lack of sophisticated investigative tools 
and techniques, poor supervision and lack of awareness of human rights. Furthermore, a number 
of institutional factors make officers who work in Upper Egypt lose interest in fulfilling their 
duty. As a result, officers may be forced or driven into assuming a political role or committing 
grave human rights abuses. 
Problems Cited by Police Officers 
Police officers are under immense pressures to work for extended hours in harsh conditions. 
They are also put under the pressure from their superiors to deliver immediate accurate result of 
investigations and solve cases as fast as possible, which may push officers to use violence 
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against citizens. However, literature suggests that “the more experienced the officer is, the less 
he is inclined to use violence against citizens.”124 As a result, officers may not have enough time 
to properly investigate the case and evaluate evidence. Not being able to meet deadlines may 
drive a police officer, especially the young and inexperienced into “irresponsible acts” that could 
“turn the officer into an accused to be punished.”125 In other words, he might forge evidence or 
torture people for confessions, and if caught, he might instead of catching criminals become a 
criminal himself. Even torture or “excessive violence” as the literature prefers to label acts of 
violence against citizens, may not help the investigation, as some suspects can confess crimes 
they have not committed only for torture to stop. An officer‟s worst nightmare is negative 
feedback from his superiors and the annual statistics indicating failures especially failure to solve 
cases.
126
 
The Ministry has modern tools that could enable police officers to solve cases and bring 
perpetrators to justice; however, for an unknown reason, they are not used. Such tools range from 
Criminal Laboratory Analysis, Forensic Laboratories, Criminal Photo Databases and others. 
Each technical tool could provide reports that cover different elements of the crime. These 
department exist; however, they are not modernized enough to fulfill their function.
127
 Forensic 
specialists can determine the cause and time of death, the way the crime was committed and the 
weapons used. There are also experts in analyzing the crime scene in terms of fingerprints, DNA 
tests, footprints and different findings in the scene. Not only can such tools enable the police 
officer to solve the case but also guarantee proper procedures to avoid nullifying the case.
128
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Most importantly, if the police authority has such tools, officers would not need to torture 
suspects, witnesses and their relatives to get confessions. In addition, officers are required to 
perform different tasks simultaneously. He might be working on a case and right after, he is 
assigned another like protecting high officials‟ commutes known in Arabic as „Tashreefat,‟ a 
football match, protecting mosques and other tasks leaving no time to properly investigate a 
case.”129  
Officers suffer lack of proper professional coaching and supervision from superior and more 
experienced officers. Therefore, it is noticeable that torture or “excessive violence” cases are 
committed by young “hasty” officers who have not received enough and proper training in 
criminal investigation.  No meetings are held with young officers who joined the force recently 
for guidance. Higher Ministry officials are to blame also for not giving orders to coach young 
recent graduates.
130
  
Only recently after various criticisms to the Ministry of Interior of using systematic torture 
against citizens did the Ministry start giving officers courses and trainings on Human Rights laws 
and regulations; however, such attempts have always been met with a great deal of skepticism 
from human rights organizations, opposition and public figures. A number of human rights 
organizations have emerged to deal with cases of human rights abuses. A large number of 
lawyers volunteer to provide legal services in support of detainees and victims of abuse. Many of 
these organizations issue reports that carry the testimonies of victims of abuse and their families. 
Sometimes, activists managed to get hold of videos of abuses that circulate social media. Despite 
the Ministry of Interior‟s continuous effort to confirm that such cases of abuse are “individual 
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cases” and do not reflect a pattern, police violence has become, in time, well-known knowledge 
displayed frankly even in some movies.  
Furthermore, the number of police personnel and officers in each police station is very 
limited (around 10), and it is hard for them to move around in villages and geographically rough 
areas. Central Security Forces cannot reach these areas easily. Finally, large areas lack vital 
public services such as paved streets provided with lights especially in villages and remote areas, 
which makes it hard for a smooth police patrolling and makes communication tools among 
officers weak. Such an atmosphere encourages more law evasion and disrespect. 
Choice of officers working in Upper Egyptian villages negatively affects the security 
situation 
Certain institutional factors however negatively affect the performance of officers assigned to 
work in Upper Egypt Upper Egyptian villages, the areas well known for being of the worst 
places police officers may work. Hot weather, poverty and harsh working conditions are all 
factors that make Upper Egypt an undesirable place for officers to work in. In the mean time, 
there are rules against having police officers work in their own villages. The Ministry, in theory, 
recognizes the need for impartiality of officers in regard to family grievances. Therefore, officers 
cannot work in their home towns or villages to avoid any potential bias towards certain 
community members at the expense of others. Therefore, officers who work in Upper Egypt are 
mostly from Northern Egypt or other governorates of Upper Egypt.
131
 As a result, working in 
Upper Egypt is an obligatory temporary assignment or a punishment for making a mistake. The 
temporary assignment last mostly for three years. In the first year, an officer is focused on 
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merely understanding the cultural and political setting in the village. In the second year, he starts 
witnessing a great deal of frustration and immense work pressures. In the third year, he may not 
be interested in working hard and delivering anxious to the moment he leaves the area. Such an 
environment strip officers of the motive to work hard or deliver proper results. The other type of 
officers in Upper Egypt is those punished for making a mistake, which implies inefficiency or 
bad conduct. This means that the area in dire need for security is entrusted to less competent 
police officers. 
The Torture Question 
The torture question is not an independent phenomenon resulting from inherent sadist 
tendencies; it is also an outcome of the entire institutional structure of the Ministry. In terms of 
torture and human rights abuse, the police force in Egypt has a very bad reputation. Both 
domestic and international human rights activists and institutions have documented and criticized 
police brutality accusing it of using “systematic torture.”132  Torture is not limited to punishing 
political opponents to Mubarak‟s regime. International and local human rights organizations 
have issued hundreds of report reporting abuses and collecting data and gathering evidence and 
testimonies. They managed to go in public with some grave cases and violations where police 
officers tortured citizens whether for political reasons or to force them to confess crimes. It might 
even be cases of power abuse driven by personal interests of police personnel and officers.  
Human rights activist accuse the police of mass arrests, keeping detainees in custody and 
torturing them forcing them to give specific testimonies. Police officers do not believe in the 
proper investigative technique of collecting evidence and facing suspects with them until they 
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either confess or the public prosecutor approves to have the case turned to court for a trial. “They 
only recognize the number-one piece of evidence, confession.”133  
Sense of Victimization 
In addition to the harsh working conditions the Ministry creates for officers to function 
and the low pay, police officers take the blame for political and social turmoil which creates a 
deep sense of victimization on the part of officers. There is a dominant sense among police 
officers that their efforts and “sacrifices,” working in harsh condition for long hours and very 
low salaries serving the country, are not appreciated. Instead, they take the blame for any 
politically-destabilizing incident that is most probably the result of political failure of the regime 
in meeting people‟s demands. Such a an environment adds to the pressures police officers suffer 
from which eventually makes them focused on keeping their job and barely performing their 
tasks fast irrespective of the potential human rights abuses or even the quality of products 
delivered. There are plenty of examples that demonstrate the political pressures exerted on the 
police force to shift their focus from their original job of securing people into protecting the 
regime. The police force has always borne the responsibility for any threat against the regime. 
Political turmoil is blamed solely on the police force, and major officers are the ones who may 
lose their jobs and reputation over failure to curb and/or quell any form of turmoil. Testimonies 
of Ministers of Interior in different media outlets, interviews, as well as their diaries show that 
such incidents are their worst nightmare. The police force has suffered certain dramatic failures 
that threatened, if not caused, ministers to be ousted. In 1965, the Military Investigative 
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Authorities „(Mabaheth Askareya,)‟ allegedly revealed a conspiracy against the regime by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and Sadat, as a member of the Free Officers Movement” blamed the police 
for not being aware of it. Both institutions went into lengthy verbal conflict or competition over 
who discovered the conspiracy.
134
 The second failure of the police force is the failure to quell the 
rebellious movement against the Egyptian control over Syria resulting into the dismantling of the 
union between Egypt and Syria in 1968. In 1958, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser managed to 
create a union with Syria and called it, the United Arab Republic (UAR) under on flag. Nasser 
adopted some economic and administrative polices that aim at centralizing decision making that 
were not favorable in Syria. A number of army officers in Syrian were resentful, and as a result, 
they managed to achieve a successful military coup on 1961, and Syria gained its independence 
from Egypt. The third major failure is the inability to discover militant Islamic movements early 
enough to avoid the terrorist attacks that took place in the eighties and nineties. Diaries of former 
ministers of interior reveal severe internal conflicts regarding the way the Ministry dealt with 
militant Islamic movements especially after the assassination of Sheikh Al Thahabi the 
prominent Islamic scholar who was well known for attacking extremist militant movements in 
1977. Some officers favored initiating talks with Islamists, while others were for using violent 
attacks against them.  
The police force was also blamed for not being able to “contain” the public protest 
against prices hikes declared in January 17
th
 1977. The events were a direct spontaneous public 
reaction against raising the price of basic foods; mass riots erupted in different parts of Egypt, 
and mass arrests followed it. President Anwar Al Sadat released a large number of prisoners, and 
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the Minister of Interior Sayed Fahmy was ousted.
135
 These events left a bad memory. Despite the 
poor handling of the situation, the Ministry of Interior did not create the political problem that 
caused the riot. Since then, the police community became vocal about their major complaint, 
bearing the cost of others‟ (politicians) mistakes. Al Nabawy Ismael thought that sustainable 
security is achieved only with providing the people with their needs and bettering their living 
conditions. As a Deputy Minister, before becoming the Minister of Interior, he volunteered to 
lead negotiations with merchants when prices got high. 
136
 Police officers are becoming vocal 
about this feeling of victimization. Politicians and public administrators take bad decisions, but 
the police bear the cost when people protest. Traffic jams occur due to bad urban planning. Tha‟r 
or blood vengeance problems in Upper Egypt take place because of a cultural heritage. An 
irrational behavior on the part of a football fan may cause a disaster.  
One of the biggest disasters the institution went through took place in 1981 when the 
president of the country, Anwar Al Sadat, was assassinated in public, in front of TV screens and 
among all state key figures during the annual victory parade held in Cairo to celebrate Egypt's 
crossing of the Suez Canal. There are different stories of the assassination conspiracy, and the 
police force was accused of negligence and bad performance. Fingers were pointed at Al 
Nabawy Ismael, (Minister of Interior from 1977-82) due to wrong piece of information and the 
aggressive strike against all opposition movements that preceded Sadat‟s assassination.137 
Sadat‟s assassination was followed by a powerful wave of attacks led by Islamic militant 
movements. On October 8
th
 1988, there were attacks where118 police officers and civilians were 
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killed. Some historical accounts suggest that there was a warning that such attacks would take 
place, but it was ignored.
138
 
One of the biggest blows to the ministry was the internal riot of members of the Riot 
Police Department. Riot Police soldiers were young unqualified and uneducated peasants who 
have to perform the military service. The army allows such large and ill-qualified young peasants 
to join the police force as members of the Riot Police responsible for quelling demonstrations 
and strikes. Sometimes they might help in daily police functions and get deployed in places like 
resorts in the summer and on Eid celebrations in need for more men on duty arises. They were ill 
paid and suffered harsh conditions. In the mid eighties, there were rumors that they will be 
required to stay for one more year. They rebelled and attacked civilians resulting in about 36 
deaths and hundreds injuries in different parts of Egypt.
139
 The blame the Ministry has received 
after all these events forces the institution to shift its attention to political functions that are not, 
in essence, theirs. They only come to bear the cost of the political failures of the regime when 
having to crush opposition. All such incidents in fact constitute part of the institutional memory 
of officers that consolidate their sense of victimization.  
Conclusion 
The way the police force handles conflicts in Upper Egypt is influenced by the lens 
through which the police force views the social setting prevalent. The police force in Egypt 
perceives the „tha’r’ as a purely sociological phenomenon that requires social and political 
remedies rather more than a security problems blaming all spread of tha’r to old decedent 
traditions and lack of religious awareness. Such a perception has pushed the police institution to 
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adopt social and political tools to solve the problem deviating from their real function, law 
enforcement. To solve cases, instead of using the various criminal investigation tools, the police 
force is working in a totally different venue, customary tribunals and their main tool for 
imposing reconciliation on all conflicting parities is threat to use arbitrary dentition and torture. 
However, while officers blame traditions, there are institutional problems within the 
Ministry of Interior that makes it hard for officers to perform their main duty. Officers do not 
have enough technical facilities to help with criminal investigation in order to surround suspects 
with evidence rather than torture them to confess. Officers suffer very harsh working conditions, 
lack of coaching and proper supervision. In the mean time, they suffer a deep sense of 
victimization for having to pay for the political failures of the regime in all walks of life. They 
have been blamed for all regime-threatening incidents, and therefore, the Ministry has shifted the 
focus from securing the community to securing the regime.  
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CHAPTER V 
LOCAL SYSTEMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A TOOL SERVING 
AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 
While the previous chapter refuted the culturist argument explaining „tha’r’ by cultural 
norms, this chapter will delve into the institutional factors inside the Ministry of Interior and the 
informal means of customary tribunals that contribute to rather than help reduce „tha’r’ rates. 
Although culture plays a role in consolidating the habit of taking vengeance, „tha’r’ is closely 
associated with economic and political considerations prevalent in Upper Egyptian villages. The 
informal system of conflict resolution, whether in the form of personal relations or customary 
tribunal serves as a political tool for political control because they do not serve justice but rather 
further a political process of consolidating existing power structure at the village level, and they 
reflect the failures of the Ministry of Interior to enforce rule of law.  
Land and Economy: Why Conflicts Erupt 
Since Upper Egypt has always been an agricultural economy, the history of Tha’r and 
conflicts in Upper Egypt is closely associated with the development of land ownership laws. The 
smaller the land gets and the poorer people become, the stronger the competition for land is. It 
also lessened the financial gap among families and intensified competition. Consequently, power 
and prestige are directly associated with wealth (i.e. land ownership and all relevant agricultural 
facilities such as access to water and other services). Most conflicts, especially „tha’r’ problems 
and the old inherited grievances are owed to conflicts over land and access to services such as 
access to water and other land-related services. While grievances are not linked to the post-1952 
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coup land reform initiative, it intensified drastically afterwards. The larger the land, the more 
powerful and richer the owner is.   
Before the 1952 coup d‟état, land ownership was concentrated among families and 
controlled by a small number of family members. Women in Upper Egypt were not entitled to 
inherit the land. Only male siblings inherited. After the Agricultural Reform Law issued in 
September 1952 by the Nasser as part of the social reform and wealth distribution limiting land 
ownership of the feudalists and distributing their land to poor peasants who suffered extreme 
poverty under feudalist control. The law limited individual ownerships to 200 „feddans.‟ The 
beneficiaries were tenants, estate workers, and the poorest villagers. The law fixed rents, set 
tenancy duration at a minimum of three years, and established a minimum wage. The law was 
followed by other ones in 1961 and 1969 that deepened the reform and further reduced the 
maximum size of landownership reducing the ceiling of ownership to 100 „feddans’ then 50 
„feddans’ in 1961 and 1969 respectively. As a result, more than 700.000‟ feddan’s were 
distributed across the country amounting for about from 12-14 percent of cultivated area. Around 
341.000 families benefited from the new law
140
 As a result, the map of wealth and power has 
changed, and competition has intensified. 
Sadat launched a fierce attack on the law and returned large amounts of land to their 
original owners before 1952 land reform. According to interviewees in the village visted „Al 
Mandara,‟ conflicts peaked during that time. Many peasants refused to lose the benefits acquired 
due to the socialist land reform of Nasser. In addition, with the relative spread of education and 
increased literacy levels, some families recognized the legal and religious right of women to 
                                                          
140
 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Egypt: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990. 
http://countrystudies.us/egypt/85.htm  
105 
 
inherit their land which resulted into further shrinking of the size of land inherited and dispersed 
distribution of property. With reduced property, comes reduced power. Therefore, male siblings 
in the family fight hard to keep their land intact without dispersion and division even at the 
expense of their female siblings and neighbors.  
Securing Property: Historical review 
In a self-help environment, Upper Egyptians have always been used to relying on 
themselves to secure their land, cattle, property and lives against aggressors which justifies the 
widespread of weapons as a norm. When the state “showed up in the 1980s and 1990s, it was 
mainly for political reasons, and therefore, the sole agent of the state in Upper Egypt, the security 
institution at the time, chose to solve the political problems using political means rather than 
paying attention to real security issues of the people. The state existence in Upper Egyptian 
villages was very minimal in different walks of life. In the village, Al Mandara, interviewees 
said that state services such as electricity, health services and roads were introduced first in the 
eighties. Before then, attention was given to Upper Egyptian major cities where the Nasserite 
regime was keen on expanding education and state services to all these cities.  
‘Tha’r‟ and security problems cannot be discussed without tracing the history of land 
protection in Upper Egypt. At the time of state building at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century by Mohamed Ali, there were attempts to achieve stability of the politically-sensitive 
areas but little was done to achieve communal security at the village level.  In 1805, he 
established an entity called the „Governor‟s Office‟ or „Diwan Al Waly‟ that was responsible for 
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maintaining order, control and dispute resolution among citizens headed by four “Ulama141” 
representing the four Islamic schools of thought „Mathaheb‟ as judges in crimes and inheritance 
issues.  Mohamed Ali also introduced an “unorganized force” called „Al Serswary’ ىراوسرسلا to 
perform the pursue offenders and preserve public peace in Cairo and major cities. However, little 
was documented with regard to the existence of similar forces performing a policing function in 
villages.
142
 By the beginning of the British occupation they were replaced by „Gandurma‟ forces 
تهردٌجلا 
Historical documents available indicate that peasants were responsible for protecting their 
own land. Only in the second half the 19
th
 century did an informal system of guarding land and 
animals in villages emerge called „Al Khafar.‟143 The „Khafar’ did not emerge as a formal 
system. They were mere unorganized individuals protecting lands and houses in return for 
financial compensation from fellahin and land owners.
144
 However, the formal security system 
was weak and almost nonexistent in the villages. In fact, the formal security system evolved 
from a communal activity to being incorporated by the state gradually and slowly. 
145
 
The first formal and organized policing system came about however in 1857 when Said 
Pasha, ruler of Egypt from 1854 - 1863, established the three ministries among which is the 
Ministry of Interior „Netharat Al Dakheleya‟ in 1857. 146  
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The Evolution of the community-based security institution, the „Khafar’ System ( ماظن
رفخلا) 
The lack of formal security apparatus gave space for a form of security system to be 
established, a system that the state started to slowly legitimize, organize and incorporate. The 
term „Khafar’147 refers to a type of security personnel that Egyptian peasants used to hire to 
protect their land, livestock and households. Even though it was created by peasants, by time, it 
acquired both administrative as well as a security function. The first official reference to Al 
Khafar came about in 1730 when they were assigned the job of collecting money from fellahin 
and report the strangers who appeared in the village. However by 1844, a law was issued by 
„Diwan al Maleya’ (تيلاولا ىاويد)  (the entity or ministry responsible for state finance) giving the 
sheikhs
148
 the right to appoint the khafar and pay them their salaries. More laws were issued to 
regulate the functioning of Khafar such as one that made the sheikhs as well as the khafar share 
the compensation given to peasants for theft. In 1875, due to troubles in organizing the work of 
khafar, the governor of Egypt, Said Pasha, introduced a new system whereby the khafar would 
have a sheikh responsible for their organization with the title of „Sheikh Al Khafar‟.149 The law 
also stipulated that each „khafeer’ should have assigned territories to protect called “darak,” and 
in return for the security service they provide, the peasants used pay the monthly compensation. 
Each village had its own “sarraf” (فارص) who handled public finances in the village to pay to 
the khafar.  The sarraf was granted the liberty to estimate how much to take from each citizen 
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depending on their wealth.  Another type of khafar also emerged whereby some had no specific 
darak  (كرد ) to protect. They were called „tawafa’ patrolling during day and night.150  
Khafar did not carry weapons until 1860 when Said Pasha gave them the right to use it. 
Each had a special authorization describing the weapon taken and the proper use of such 
weapons would be guaranteed by the sheikh of the village. Only in 1871, did „khafar’ become 
linked to the official security institution. Ismael Pasha added a different amendment to the laws 
giving the “mudereya” (تيريدولا), the state head police department in a city, the right to appoint the 
„khafar’ not the sheikhs, and their number should not be less than 5 percent of the total male 
population in the village. Within each „muderyea,‟ there was a „mufatesh’ or inspector 
supervising the work of the „khafar.‟ The amendment made by Ismail also did not give them the 
right to buy the weapon of their choice but rather take weapons from the „mudereya.‟151 
Peasants did not rely on the khafar though; they used to have their own weapons ranging 
from sticks „nababeet’ knives and guns. They used to protect their farms and animals against 
theft or attack by wild animals.
152
 The available historical accounts do not reveal when the 
official law prohibiting citizens from carrying guns was issued, but a historical document 
referred to a case in 1849 revealing that there must have been a prior notification to people not to 
carry guns. In 1853, there was a law organizing the ownership of weapons prohibiting Egyptians 
and Settled Bedouins „U’rban’ (ىابرعلا )  from owning weapons and allowing it for Turks and 
Wandering Bedouins „U’rban’ and those performing the pilgrimage. The sheikhs were 
responsible for collecting the weapons in their areas of control.
153
 Organized gangs were “village 
                                                          
150
 Helal. 2007, 76-77. 
151
 Ibid , 74-8. 
152
 Ibid, 74-80.  
153
 Ibid, 85-91. 
109 
 
specific phenomenon” in Egypt154. There were nonexistent in cities. There were gangs in the 
Delta region as well as Upper Egypt, and there were bloody fights with the Khafar and the 
villagers.
155
 
 Such community based evolutionary process reveals lack of interest in maintaining 
security in society. In fact, it left the people, especially the poor in villages under the mercy of 
the rich and influential land owners who paid “khafar.” As a result, the ability of an individual to 
secure his property is linked to his ability to hire whoever can protect the land and buys them 
weapons to be able to perform that function. Even though security of life and property is a public 
good and a basic human right that is the responsibility of the state not the individual, people have 
to pay for it in Upper Egypt.  
Modern Police and Securing Land 
 The police force is a “new” agent in Upper Egyptian villages.  All interviewees, when 
talking about state existence in Upper Egyptian villages, agreed that police had no visible 
physical or actual existence in Upper Egypt until the eighties and nineties according to 
interviewees. Until this very moment, „Khafar’ system is sill existing. The richer the individual 
is, the more armed „khafar’ he can get to protect land and cattle. Although the police force has 
grown bigger in size and became more sophisticated and includes now more than 30 departments 
covering different aspects, its existence in Upper Egyptian villages is very limited. In each 
village, there is a police station comprising an average of 8-15 officers and police individuals 
from different ranks. Brigadier Reda said that police force is very weak in the village, and there 
is no force to protect the people, land and property what so ever. Therefore, there has to be a 
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„kabeer’ to protect people‟s interests.  Weapons are very expensive, and therefore, owning them 
requires either being wealthy or planting drugs or armed robbery.
156
 
The infiltration of the police into Upper Egyptian villages was not due to a political will 
to maintain peace and order but for political reasons. Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s faced the 
grave danger of militant Islamic groups, some of whom found refuge in such remote areas 
governed and protected by armed families. Only then did the state intervene in Upper Egypt to 
catch them. Due to the sophisticated geographical structure of mountains surrounding the 
cultivable valley, and the rigid tribal structure that has rules against turning in relative fugitives, 
police forces needed allies in the region to be able to reach even the most dangerous areas.  
One of the most extreme examples of such alliances took place in Nekheila village in 
Assyut in 2004. The story has different versions, however, and as one police officer 
interviewed,
157
 Ezzat Hanafy, the head figure of one of the two prominent families in Nekheila 
was a drug and arms dealer who was “created,” as the officer said, by state officials. They helped 
his business, drugs, become lucrative in return for his efforts in turning in Islamist militant 
groups. However, in the year 2004, “problems” erupted between state officials and Hanafy who 
managed to isolate the village from any form of state control. As a result, the Ministry of Interior 
used heavy armaments and thousands of soldiers to “liberate” the village, and Hanafy received a 
death sentence in 2006. Nekheila is an extreme example of the regime making alliances with 
individuals; however, such alliances are manifested in relations with “al kabeer” (the major 
figure head in a village) or customary tribunals. 
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Conflict Resolution: Two Types 
 Conflict resolution takes two forms, either through use of power by influential 
figures through their personal relations with police representatives or through customary 
tribunals, but the political implications for both forms are similar. During this research, two 
villages were visited, Nazza Karar and Al Mandara in the governorate of Assyut. 
 In Nazza Karar, Brigadier Reda belongs to the most powerful family in the village 
and the richest. He does not hold an official post in the village but his cosine, a major in the 
police force, is the official Omdah. The Omdah does not interfere in domestic problems as much 
as his cosine. Brigadier Reda talked with pride about the top police figures in the village he has 
good relations with from head of state security office in Assyut, head of security department in 
the governorate and all other major officers. “The head of security in the village –known as 
Ma’mur- calls me where there is a certain conflict to get to know the people, the history of the 
conflict, and how the issue should be handled. We work together.” he said. 
  Brigadier Reda gave plenty of examples of exchanging favors and cooperation to 
achieve peace and security in the village. Examples range from settling disputes between some 
fugitives living in the mountains surrounding the villages called „matareed’ to personal 
problems. One of the very simple examples just settled before the interview is one where two 
families had a conflict. Animosities exacerbated even though there were inter-marital 
relationship between them. As a result, both families decided to expel two women and their 
children and forced their husbands into divorce. Both women asked Brigadier Reda to intervene. 
Brigadier Reda called the head of security in the village „ma’mour’ to help him with the case. In 
return, the „ma’mour’ asked both heads of families to deliver the machine guns they have or else 
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they would be detained under the emergency law. In the mean time, Brigadier Reda “ordered” 
them to have both husbands take their wives and children back. Both heads of families delivered 
some weapons, and were forced to order both husbands to re-marry their wives.  
 The question of „fugitives‟ in the mountain is another complicated issue that is 
solved through personal relationships and alliances. Brigadier Reda said that they may not be all 
criminals or “bad people” as he labeled them. Some may be considered outcast for defying their 
families for whatever reason. Some families may consider it legitimate to kill one of their 
members if they follow orders. Others may be criminals in the legal sense of the term but 
innocent in such cultural setting such as some of those who took their vengeance. In this case, he 
has to live with other criminals who live off attacking villages, armed robbery or arms trade. 
Police cannot protect members from their families grip. Brigadier Reda said „matareed’ once 
shot some police officers, and the head of security in the governorate „mudeer al amn‟ threatened 
other officers if they do not catch them. Police officers did catch them, but Brigadier Reda, 
knowing some of them, interfered to release them. He said that their release was achieved “for 
his sake,” which suggests that there might be other favors Brigadier Reda presents to the police. 
Brigadier Reda was very outspoken and vocal about such favors that help him keep the close 
relations with the police, support for the National Democratic Party (NDP). He said that he uses 
all his powers to help the party win the elections. He declares support to any NDP candidate and 
asks people to support him as well.  
  Customary tribunals are not „benign‟ means of conflict resolution. They are 
different tools of political control, as the regime allies with some major families to solve dispute, 
through the Ministry of Interior. Customary tribunals work better in villages where there are 
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more than one and powerful family. In a multi-polar environment, there is no one single „kabeer’ 
who has the charisma or influence over the people. Therefore, allying with a certain figure to 
help impose peace and order and guarantee voters‟ support is risky. Underneath the extensive use 
of customary tribunals lies plenty of political problems and issues that reveal institutional 
weakness in the Ministry of Interior.  
 First, adversaries seek reconciliation through arbitration rather than justice and 
peace. While various customary “judge” interviewed brag about their seeking justice and 
applying Shari’a, many cases show that they are very pragmatic in dealing with power politics in 
a conflict. For example, Rasha, an interviewee who lives in Assyut the city and whose brother is 
an immigrant had to give up portions of their inherited land located in the countryside to one of 
their neighbors who have the money, men and weapons to take over their entire land and used to 
attack the land every now and then. When they sought customary forms of conflict resolution, 
judges issued a decree giving some land to the “aggressive” neighbor to fend off his constant 
attacks on the original owners who do not have the means or the time to protect their land. The 
customary tribunal was not there, not to achieve justice, but rather to settle the issue 
pragmatically. Sheikh Odah said that one of the main principles of arbitration is derived from an 
Islamic principle of “تعفٌولا بلج يلع مدقه ةدسفولا ءرد” which means “warding off evil is more 
important that brining benefits.” The implication of this principle is that it is legitimate to 
compromise people‟s rights. Therefore, customary tribunals tend to reflect the existing power 
structure in the village. Power is defined in terms of wealth, weapons, and ability to bully other 
citizens if necessary.  
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 Second, adversary parties have to agree to the holding of the tribunal itself. It is 
not mandatory, but held under ethical and social pressures. This means no recognition of the 
state as the primary arbitrator whose responsibility is upholding rule of law. Giving people the 
option for adjudicating or not adjudication is dangerous to its credibility and a sign of weakness. 
It means there are parties that are beyond pressures just because they are more powerful. In such 
an atmosphere, it is improper to talk about “justice.” Many customary judges, Sheikh Odah, and 
Refa‟t Al Shelh, one of the customary judges of Manfalout, talked about the role played by the 
security institution in this regard. When a party refuses to resort to a customary tribunal, the 
police “uses its own means of forcing them into it,” all interviewees agree. This opens the door 
for use of brutality. Brigadier Mohamed Reda said that the police uses pre-signed emergency law 
decisions to do so. They hold them under emergency law until they are forced to accept to use 
the customary tribunal and accept its verdict. “Emergency law decisions are signed and ready in 
their offices ready to be used against anytime,” Brigadier Reda said In this case, and nature and 
intensity of relations between each family and police is put into considerations, and some get 
special treatment. As spelt out in detail earlier, the literature on tha’r in the police academy 
discussed earlier when suggesting tools to solve conflicts, it focused on building relations with 
family figure-heads, the impartiality of the police in using emergency laws in detaining citizens 
is questioned. There are serious implications to such cooperation. 
  On the one hand, police force consolidates the exiting power structures 
empowering the already influential families. Such relationships forms the citizens‟ view of the 
state, a brutal ally to the powerful families in the village and therefore a party in any conflict not 
an impartial entity. Therefore, the police is both a party to the conflict and an arbitrator. The 
„kabarah’ system explained earlier is also another form of consolidating the status quo and 
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existing distribution of power among families. It gives more leverage to the wealthy families and 
makes the poorer more vulnerable to wealthy. 
 Finally, a deeper look in the background of customary judges reveals that many of 
them are regime co-opted individuals who either join the NDP or support it. Ref‟at Al Shelh of 
Manfalout is a famous customary judge in the area as well as the head of conflict resolution 
committee of the NDP branch in Assyut. Sheikh Odah of Shubra El Kheima was an NDP 
member and a member of parliament for years. Other customary judges met are also either NDP 
members of supporters. This raises question regarding the role of local governance in governing 
and settling disputes. A significant portion of customary judges control local councils that are 
well known for being a hub for local leaders looking for a stronger political role through the 
government and relations with the ruling party.  
Role of Local Administration versus Role of Police in Conflict Resolution  
The police-state used local administration to help with the process of conflict resolution 
at the expense of its original role of local governance. This was the result of a long history of 
legal and actual conflict between the government wing advocating more independence from the 
central government and the security apparatus. From a normative perspective, the role of local 
leadership should include contributing to solving a wide array of problems people at the village 
level suffer from ranging from sanitation, schooling, water supply, access to fertilizers and 
pestisides, roads and all other village-related problems. In fact, these problems, conflict over land 
and access to water, are the main source of conflict that erupts in villages and consequently 
different kinds of attacks and tha’r. However, the regime has destroyed their real role in society. 
It altered their role, legally, from local “governance” to local “administration” and, de facto, 
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turning them into regime clients whose best contribution lies in resolving conflicts among 
families. 
 Although the dynamics are different from those used before 1952 coup, the Police force 
continues to play politics at the grass-root level by crushing the role of local government 
councils. Instead of having them play a role in local development, they are considered tools used 
by the police to control the political scene. It took the police a long time to strip local 
administration of their independence.  
The relationship between police and local administration is hard to make generalizations 
about. However, there have been incidents where conflicts were reported, and the security 
institution finally managed to strip local authorities of many of their powers. One of the most 
important state administrative bodies in a village is an entity called “local council.” Local 
Councils are not local governments with a degree of autonomy. It is assumed to be 
“administrative structures executing government polices at the grassroots level.”158 Egypt has 26 
governorates each with two boards “governing” local affairs, an executive board with appointed 
government officials and popular local council directly elected by local communities.
159
 In the 
1980s, under Mubarak, the government changed its perception of the role of local administration 
“confining its role mainly to the provision of social services and the building of local 
infrastructure” limiting its representative function and emphasizing it developmental one.160 The 
laws in the constitution governing the functioning of local councils in Egypt are designed to keep 
them under the mighty hand of the central government. First, their establishment is up to the 
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central government based on how it perceives “common interest.” Second, article 162 of the 
Constitution talks about “gradual transfer of authority” to local councils, a process that is entirely 
controlled by the central government. Third, article 163 of the Egyptian 1971 constitution leaves 
a large room for the government to direct all the activities of such councils. It is the government 
that determines their financial resources, their relations to the executive and legislative branches 
and the nature of their developmental role.
161
 The law number 145 of 1988 changed the name of 
local authorities from “local government” and the name of the ministry managing local 
authorities, “Ministry of Local Government,” to “local administration” and “The Ministry of 
Local Administration” transforming it into a mere “administrative system” executing 
government policies at grass-root level as opposed to local government.  
  It is the High Council/Ministry of Local Administration that puts forward the rules as a 
part of the executive branch. There is the executive board in each governorate. This council is 
formed and headed by the governor including his assistants, chiefs of districts, towns, urban 
quarters and heads of public departments, agencies and authorities within the government. That 
council carries out, monitors and follows up the implementation of projects, prepares the budget, 
sets financial and administrative plans, examines recommendations of local councils and 
expresses their opinions on these proposed topic and investment projects, sets the regulations for 
effective performance.
162
 They have monopoly over the decision making process at the local 
level, and the laws do not draw clear distinctions as to the rights and obligations of each body 
giving the executive councils the upper hand. Local elected councils are not allowed to challenge 
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the decision of local councils. On the contrary, the law enables executive appointed officials to 
“check on local councils and interfere in their affairs”.163 
There have often been conflicts between the security institution and men of local 
administration and even local officials like the governor himself, and the tension may be 
professional, personal or maybe both. Recent history has recorded incidents of this sort. Zaki 
Badr, the former Minister of Interior was the only one vocal about such problems. The problems 
may range from personal grievances of security officials thinking they more power than local 
officials and trespassing the governor‟s authorities. The conflict happened between both parties 
when it comes to the way they deal with Islamic militant groups. For example, in Asyut in the 
1980s, Al Nabawy Ismael, a former Minister of Interior, accused the governor of leaking 
information to the Islamic militant movements. They were known for their position refusing 
police confrontation with these groups.
164
 The interesting piece of information is that all the 
governors of Asyut have are former police officials themselves.  
In 1980-1981, a fierce battle took place regarding the first draft of the local 
administration law 1980/1. The draft gave the governor authority over the police force existing in 
the governorate. Al Nabawy Ismael, the minister of interior at the time, was absolutely against 
such law. It was against the “notion of security as a central service that cannot work with 26 
mentalities, 26 policies in 26 governorates.”165 
On the national level, the Minister of Interior is more powerful than the minister for 
Local Administration. However, at the village level, the relationship between both government 
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bodies has been fluctuating. Even though it is dangerous to draw generalizations, history sites 
cases of tension and sometimes cooperation between officials from both ministries on the 
governorate level as well as the village level.  
There were cases where the head of a security establishment trespasses the governor in 
the governorate he is serving. The former minister of Interior, Zaki Badr cited the most 
celebrated examples of such occurring. He was the governor of Asyut before becoming the 
Minister of Interior, the head of the security establishment in Asyut used to trespass him in all 
decisions, and he even had his car searched for suspicion of illicit substance when he was out of 
Asyut.
166
 
However, the most celebrated example happened in 1981, when the Ministry of Interior 
was planning to make a large campaign of arrests to members of Al Jamm’aa Al Islameya in 
Asyut, and the then, governor of Asyut Mohamed Othman Ismael, was accused of leaking that 
piece of information to the local population targeted with the arrests. At the time, the Minister of 
Interior, Al Nabawy Ismael, and Othman Ismail had their disagreements with regards to how to 
deal with the Jama‟at. The governor, Othman Ismail, believed in the necessity of communication 
and cooperation rather than “direct conflict.” The fact that the governor himself may come from 
a security background does not prevent such conflicts.
167
  
The conflict escalated even more in the early eighties with the making of the law of local 
administration. The first draft of the law stipulated that the security bodies existing within the 
governorate should be put under the authority of the governor not the Minister of Interior. Fouad 
Mohy Din, the vice Prime Minister then, was the one insisting on incorporating such a law, but 
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Al Nabawy Ismael, the Minister of Interior threatened to resign. He argued that Security in the 
country has to be central following one major strategy not 26 each for each governorate.
168
 
However, Sadat eventually refused to incorporate that clause in the new law. Hassan Abu Basha, 
a former Minister of Interior, used to complain from lack of political attention to the political 
views of security institution‟s members.169 Eventually, the security institution won the battle, and 
local government was stripped of many of its powers and was restricted to simple developmental 
functions.   
Conclusion  
 History matters when explaining phenomenon such as the local systems of conflict 
resolution. Lack of state-controlled policing system in Upper Egypt that could protect land and 
property is the main reason behind all conflicts erupting. However, the irony is in the 21
st
 
century, still this problem exists. There is a police force existent in each and every village; 
however, the police cannot protect land and property. Still people rely on their own weapons and 
hired personnel to protect their economic interests and lives. In fact, the official formal 
institution of the state that is presumably responsible for upholding rule of law, the police force, 
is even consolidating the informal means of conflict resolution by all possible means.  
 Consolidating the system comes through creating a „clientalist‟ network of political 
support at the local level. Most customary judges were linked to Mubarak‟s ruling party. All 
different channels of conflict resolution had to be through NDP members. In fact, Brigadier Reda 
summarized the relationship frankly when he talked about the need to protect his interest, and 
therefore, he has to ally with whoever is in power. In order to maintain the same power structure 
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in the village, local leaders have to be co-opted by the regime, and in return, the regime helps 
with maintaining the status quo.  
In the mean time, the role of local leader has to be constrained to be under the political 
control of the regime. The system of local governance was stripped of its power to be mere 
“administrators” whose only responsibility is to execute the centrally-put-forward policies. It is 
the body that should solve the root-causes of different community problems that is now has their 
members playing the role of “arbitrators.” Those same members belong to the same families who 
have the money and power to impose a certain power structure not uphold rule of law. The state 
agent responsible for upholding rule of law is in fact allying with those local power figures.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Governability or social order is a multi-faceted phenomenon where different actors, 
state, society and ruling regime, interact on daily basis. Sometimes, it is the regime that is 
blamed for the weak intensity of governance. Sometimes, it is the cultural setting and social 
norms that are accused of being anti-state. Culture in Upper Egypt has always been blamed for 
the inability of the police force to penetrate society and uphold rule of law. Many excuses are 
given such as lack of community cooperation to resistance from the people. Layman explanation 
of the tha’r phenomenon may go as far as making accusations of Upper Egyptians for being 
“stubborn,” and “ignorance.” Such culturalist arguments are not worthy of analysis in a scholarly 
document. Instead, this piece of research has looked into the phenomenon, explained its cultural 
roots. It tackled the phenomenon of tha’r as part of a bigger phenomenon of informal means of 
conflict resolution and the weak state penetration in society. The essence of „stateness‟ is its 
ability to enforce rule of law. Resorting to informality is a regime strategy to weaken the state. 
The regime compromised the role of the when it, first, it gave more power to customary forms of 
conflict resolution despite Egypt‟s long legal and constitutional heritage. Second, it weakened 
the police force from the inside in ways that affected its ability perform its duty. Third, it made 
the security institution assume a political role in service of the ruling regime instead of achieving 
security.  
The main obstacle to studying state capacity is the theoretical debates over the meaning 
of basic concepts of the “state” and “state capacity.” The different definitions and perspectives of 
the state have influenced the way scholarly literature has attempted to explain social 
phenomenon. This piece of research argues that state capacity is closely associated with the 
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ability to enforce rule of law through its executive arm. Rule of the law enforcement is the most 
important element of stateness across different fields, and it is the main determinant of state 
capacity. 
The concept of the “state” has evolved throughout centuries from being a synonym for 
the ruling class, a reflection of the power struggles within society, an abstract idea of a 
“collective citizen” or a “General Will,” to a more sophisticated definition that refused the 
dichotomy between the state and society, refused reducing the state to a mere ruling class, 
acknowledge the abstractness of the idea of the state but pinpoints its manifestations in the real 
world. That is the Weberian definition of the state as the human community which monopolizes 
the legitimate use of force emphasizing the issue of governability or the intensity of governance 
versus anarchy.  
The following analysis of governability in Egypt is based on the statist intuitionalist 
approach that is based on the assumption that there the state is a different structure of power that 
is capable of affecting and altering the outcomes of regime policies and societal choices.  
Customs are not necessarily associated with a traditional society. It is true that the formal 
state legal system evolved from being customary laws in Ancient times; however, customs still 
plays a significant role in the modern legal systems all over the world. Some legal systems are 
based, to a large extent, on customary norms, and others, such as Egypt, has custom as a major 
source of law. Custom and law are not in conflict, and in some cases, they are not in absolute 
harmony. The Egyptian legal system has four sources of law put forward in a hierarchy of power, 
laws promulgated by the parliament, custom, Islamic Jurisprudence and principles of justice and 
natural law. The conflict erupts when a long-established customary rule conflicts with the state 
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rules and laws such as the criminal code. Egypt is one of the countries with a strong legal and 
constitutional heritage. However, when people resort to informality, it might indicate problems 
with the legal system, either its judicial or executive branch. 
 The judicial system in Egypt does suffer problems that the political regime showed little 
interest in reforming, which might results into the very slow legal process and maybe 
compromising their independence and integrity. Judges are limited in number; their financial 
standard is not up to the current rates of inflation, and control for the executive branch of 
government. As a result, it can be argued that resorting to customary forms of conflict resolution 
is becoming a phenomenon. Contrary to common stereotypes, customary tribunals are not 
limited to Upper Egypt, which is already a large segment of population in Egypt, it is spreading 
in other parts of Egypt such as Sinai and the even the densely populated Delta Region. Such 
spread is a sign that the general trend is leaning towards customary forms of conflict resolution 
rather than state-mediated system.  
Blaming Tha’r on poverty, illiteracy and tradition is a misleading conclusion. Th’r is 
indeed a cultural tradition, and most perpetrators are illiterates; however, this is far from being 
enough to prove that links tha’r to illiteracy. Educated family members still commit tha’r, but 
they may not take it with their own hands so as not “sacrifice” the educated members they take 
pride in. Professional assassins are hired for that purpose. In addition, limiting the scope of 
research to focusing on the social drives for tha’r means ignoring one of the most important 
actors involved in the phenomenon, the state. Ignoring the interaction of the main state institution 
that assumes the function of maintaining order in society, the police force, leads defiantly to 
deformed results.  
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The way the police force handles conflicts in Upper Egypt is influenced by the lens 
through which the police force views the social setting prevalent. The police force in Egypt 
perceives the „tha’r’ as a purely sociological phenomenon that requires social and political 
remedies rather more than a security problems blaming all spread of tha’r to old decedent 
traditions and lack of religious awareness. Such a perception has pushed the police institution to 
adopt social and political tools to solve the problem deviating from their real function, law 
enforcement. To solve cases, instead of using the various criminal investigation tools, the police 
force is working in a totally different venue, customary tribunals and their main tool for 
imposing reconciliation on all conflicting parities is threat to use arbitrary dentition and torture. 
However, while officers blame traditions, there are institutional problems within the 
Ministry of Interior that makes it hard for officers to perform their main duty. Officers do not 
have enough technical facilities to help with criminal investigation in order to surround suspects 
with evidence rather than torture them to confess. Officers suffer very harsh working conditions, 
lack of coaching and proper supervision. In the mean time, they suffer a deep sense of 
victimization for having to pay for the political failures of the regime in all walks of life. They 
have been blamed for all regime-threatening incidents, and therefore, the Ministry has shifted the 
focus from securing the community to securing the regime.  
 History matters when explaining phenomenon such as the local systems of conflict 
resolution. Lack of state-controlled policing system in Upper Egypt that could protect land and 
property is the main reason behind all conflicts erupting. However, the irony is in the 21
st
 
century, still this problem exists. There is a police force existent in each and every village; 
however, the police cannot protect land and property. Still people rely on their own weapons and 
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hired personnel to protect their economic interests and lives. In fact, the official formal 
institution of the state that is presumably responsible for upholding rule of law, the police force, 
is even consolidating the informal means of conflict resolution by all possible means.  
 Consolidating the system comes through creating a „clientalist‟ network of political 
support at the local level. Most customary judges were linked to Mubarak‟s ruling party. All 
different channels of conflict resolution had to be through NDP members. In fact, Brigadier Reda 
summarized the relationship frankly when he talked about the need to protect his interest, and 
therefore, he has to ally with whoever is in power. In order to maintain the same power structure 
in the village, local leaders have to be co-opted by the regime, and in return, the regime helps 
with maintaining the status quo.  
In the mean time, the role of local leader has to be constrained to be under the political 
control of the regime. The system of local governance was stripped of its power to be mere 
“administrators” whose only responsibility is to execute the centrally-put-forward policies. It is 
the body that should solve the root-causes of different community problems that is now has their 
members playing the role of “arbitrators.” Those same members belong to the same families who 
have the money and power to impose a certain power structure not uphold rule of law. The state 
agent responsible for upholding rule of law is in fact allying with those local power figures.  
Potential Cost for Applying Rule of Law & Recommendations for Future 
Improvement 
The co-optation of the Mubarak‟s regime of local leadership and maintaining the existing 
power structure is a political choice, which raises a number of questions. The most important 
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question has to do with the cost of attempting to refrain from playing politics at the local level 
and achieving a shift in the police force towards efforts to abide by the law as much as possible. 
Enforcing rule of law would defiantly challenge the existing power structure at the village level 
challenging the authority of many power families. Major families in Upper Egypt are well 
known for being well armed and enjoy a varying degree of popular support in villages. Can the 
state interfere using its hard power to achieve a higher degree of law enforcement and equality 
before law without any consideration of the powerful leaders in the social community? The 
answer to this question is complicated. 
 As argued before, the emergence of the local system of conflict resolution with its rules, 
regardless of the how just these rules are nor not, was associated with lack of state interest in 
maintain peace and order in such areas. As mentioned earlier, the police started to exist only in 
the Eighties and Nineties of the twentieth century. For the people to stop relying on their own 
weapons and hired personnel to protect their land, property and their own lives, there has to be a 
trusted alternative. There has to exist a judicial process as well as an enforcement agency with a 
minimal degree of public trust.  
The judiciary has to be revolutionalized. The numbers of courts and judges have to 
increase in order to examine as many cases as possible so that conflicting parties will not have to 
wait for years in court. Second, judges have to enjoy a larger degree of independence from the 
executive branch to guarantee independence. Third, the financial standard of judges has to 
increase in order to minimize cases of judicial corruption. 
On the other hand, the executive arm has to undergo severe internal changes. Resources 
have to be properly channeled to serving the community, adopting modern techniques of 
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criminal investigation, providing officers with proper coaching and supervision, and the police 
force need to change their perspective of the residents of the local traditions. Traditions and 
norms are not static ideas that people are destined to follow. Norms change, and underneath 
these norms, there are power relations and pragmatic reasons that helped them exist. 
Does the State have a Choice?  
By nature, the state is one of the very powerful tools capable of inflicting change if the 
political regime controlling it is willing to. Of course it cannot eliminate such a deeply 
entrenched phenomenon especially after decades of official recognition and encouragement; 
however, state intervention in the right direction may provide an alternative to the people. 
Historically, people resorted to customary forms of conflict resolution mainly because of 
pragmatic reasons. If the conditions change, an increasing number of people will move towards 
more just paths of conflict resolution rather than having to comply with political power 
compromises that could be unjust many times. Change does not take place overnight. However, 
the political regime entrusted to the managing the state has to start with reform and follow the 
proper track of upholding rule of law as much possible.  
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